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RETRYING RACE

Anthony V. Alfieri*

INTRODUCTION
This Essay investigates the renewed prosecution of long-dormant
criminal and civil rights cases of white-on-black racial violence arising
out of the 1950s and 1960s. The study is part of an ongoing project on
race, lawyers, and ethics within the criminal-justice system.' Framed
by this larger project, the Essay explores the normative and sociolegal
meaning of that resurgent prosecution. My hope in pursuing this
inquiry is to better understand, and perhaps begin to refashion, the
prosecutor's redemptive role in cases of racial violence.2

* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of
Miami School of Law. A.B. 1981, Brown University; J.D. 1984, Columbia University School
of Law. - Ed. I am grateful to Adrian Barker, Richard Delgado, John Ely, Michael Fischl,
Ellen Grant, Patrick Gudridge, Amelia Hope, Don Jones, Cynthia McKenzie, Martha
Minow, Harriet Roberts, Peggy Russell, Jonathan Simon, Karen Throckmorton, Frank Val
des, and Eric Yamamoto for their comments and support.
I also wish to thank Javier Avino, Wendy Blasius, David Birke, Chauncey Kelly, Lauren
Luis, Claudine Rigaud, Nathaniel Tobin, and the University of Miami School of Law library
staff for their research assistance, as well as Nadia Shihata and the editors of the Michigan
Law Review for their devotion.
This Essay mourns for my father, John B. Alfieri, no one to drive the car.

1. See Anthony V.Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM.L. REV. 1301 (1995) (ex
ploring the rhetoric of race in cases of black-on-white racially motivated violence; citing the
defense of Damian Williams and Henry Watson on charges of beating Reginald Denny and
others during the 1992 South Central Los Angeles riots); Anthony V.Alfieri, Lynching Ethics:
Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH.L. REV. 1063 (1997) (probing racial rhetoric
in cases of white-on-black racially incited violence; noting the civil and criminal trial of the
Ku Klux Klan in the 1981 lynching of Michael Donald); Anthony V.Alfieri, Prosecuting Race,
48 DUKEL.J.1157 (1999) (examining the federal prosecution of five white New York City police
officers charged with assaulting Abner Louima, a young male Haitian immigrant, in 1997);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809
(2000) (hereinafter Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community) (discussing the
1990-91 Central Park Jogger sexual assault trials in New York City and the 1998-99 James Byrd
capital murder trials in Jasper, Texas); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89
GEO.L.J. 2228 (2001) (assembling "race-conscious, community regarding methods of represen
tation culled from conventional and alternative models of criminal prosecution and defense");
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEXAS L.REV. 1293 (1998) (hereinafter Alfieri, Race Trials)
(analyzing the rhetorical meaning of race in the federal and state trials of Lemrick Nelson,
which grew out of four days of interracial violence in the Crown Heights section of Brook
lyn, New York, in 1991).
2. Prior efforts in this enterprise to reconstruct prosecutor and defender roles have
sparked criticism. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives:
Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788 (1996); Richard Delgado,
Making Pets: Social Workers, "Problem Groups, " and the Role ofthe SPCA - Getting a Lit
tle More Precise About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1571 (1999); Christopher
1 141

1142

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1141

Both descriptive and prescriptive in nature, the inquiry addresses
race in relation to law and community.3 Grappling with the historical
violence accompanying that troubled relationship, the Essay employs
the notion of race cases to decipher juridical forms of white-on-black
violence, parsing their content and tracing their genealogy in selected
criminal and civil rights prosecutions of the 1950s and 1960s.4 The
central purpose of this inquiry is to ground the justification for retry

ing race cases in the discretionary ethics of the prosecution function
and the normative jurisprudence of criminal justice.
Race cases present hard and easy judgments of prosecutorial
discretion. The threshold justification for retrying race cases comes
from the standard conception of discretion and its adversary system
based sources of normative guidance. Under standard discretion, easy
cases for retrial emerge from supervening events material to the
outcome of prior prosecutions, such as the discovery of new physical
evidence, the identification of new witnesses, and the belated proffer
of inculpating confessions. Hard cases, by comparison, resurface on
their own strength of merit without the benefit of supervening events.
In such cases, prosecutors adduce no new evidence, produce no new
witnesses, and offer no startling "deathbed" confessions. Instead, they
grasp the elusive opportunity to right historical wrongs committed in

aborted or failed criminal and civil rights prosecutions.
Standard discretion permits prosecutors to seize the opportunity to
renew aborted and correct failed race case proceedings. The seizure of
prosecutorial power, however well-intentioned, is distinct from the
reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion. To be sure, power is the
necessary precondition of discretion. Yet, power alone is insufficient
to give reasoned justification for reopening long-dormant cases.
Indeed, if the reopening of race cases turned solely on evenhanded
prosecutorial power, then black victims would not have been made to
suffer decades of irrevocable loss and white lawbreakers would not
have enjoyed the freedom of lasting immunity.
The hazard of extending the inquiry of reopening beyond the
bluntness of curative power is both theoretical and practical. Power
infects law and society.5 It adopts manifold public and private forms.

Slobogin, Race-Based Defenses - The Insights of Traditional Analysis, 54 ARK. L. REV. 739
(2002); Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal De
fense, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1585 (1999). But see Alex J. Hurder, The Pursuit of Justice: New
Directions in Scholarship About the Practice of Law, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 185-86 (2002).
3. For an elegant account of the intersection of law and community, see AVIAM SOIFER,

LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995).
4. See infra Section II.A.

5. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed. 1979) (1975); JUSTICE AND POWER IN
SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES ( Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998); Jonathan Simon,
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And it finds expression in myriad state, institutional, and individual
actions. Allied with race, it distorts lawyer cognition and episte
mology, and deforms sociolegal discourse and ideology. The upshot of
that alliance is displayed in the decades of prosecutorial inaction to

ward reopening race cases.
The clandestine alliance of race and power endangers efforts to
explicate and j ustify reopening under the ethical and jurisprudential
norms of criminal justice. Inside the criminal-justice system, race and
power seem veiled, furtively encircling prosecutors and fouling their
professional judgment. Ensnared by race-embedded tradition,
prosecutors seem inured to ethical or j urisprudential calls for reopen

ing. And yet, drawing on the tenets of liberal legalism, the criminal
justice system concedes not only a measure of independence to
prosecutors, but also a degree of autonomy to law.6
Predicated on liberal legalism, the call for reopening echoes the
precepts of lawyer independence and the autonomy of law. Like
power, however, these precepts mix with race to constrain prosecutor .
independence and jurisprudential autonomy. The constraint rises from
color and the foundational commitment to a colorblind j urisprudence.
Unsurprisingly, the j urisprudence of a colorblind faith in criminal
j ustice prosecutions in part explains the reopening of dormant race
cases. As to black victims and white offenders, that faith dictates
equality of treatment, for example, in the submission of new evidence.
B ut that explanation applies only to easy cases of newly discovered
evidence. It fails to explain the delay in reopening hard cases, where
prosecutorial judgment is solely at stake.
The genesis of a colorblind commitment to criminal j ustice extends
far into American legal history. Colorblind claims propound a prose

cutorial stance of neutrality toward race and race cases. For prosecu
tors occupying this stance and contemplating reopening criminal and
civil rights cases, race is inapposite. But for divergences of fact or law,
like cases are to be treated alike in context and in retrospect.
The aesthetics and mechanics of colorblind prosecution offer an
appealing formalism. As a model of legal process, prosecutorial
formalism carries integrity and efficiency. Yet, when applied to dor
mant race cases, it lacks an explanation and a justification for histori
cal delay. Putting aside lawyer error or misconduct, colorblind prose
cutors cannot account for either delay or failure in reopening past
prosecutions, except to cite extra-judicial sources of interference, such
as j ury nullification, police corruption or witness intimidation.

Between Power and Knowledge: Habermas, Foucault, and the Future of Legal Studies, 28
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 947 (1 994).
6. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 219-69
(1975).
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The contemporary legacy of colorblind prosecution is color-coded
pretext. Driven by mixed motives, the twin desires to stand presently
unbiased and rectify past injustice, color-coded claims maintain a
disinterested stance while surreptitiously evoking, and often exploit
ing, racial status and stereotypes. Posed as dispassionate and objective,
color-coded prosecutions impart a familiar instrumentalism. Unlike a
formalist model of legal process, instrumentalism is purposive and

result-oriented. As a model, however, it lacks candor and risks unfair
ness to both victim and offender. Despite a lack of transparency and
the risk of unfairness, color-coded prosecutions supply a legitimate
justification for reopening race cases. Outcome-orientation notwith
standing, color-coded-driven reopenings advance dignity and equality
norms on behalf of the victim and the state. Reopening affirms the
dignity and worth of the victim as an inviolate person. At the same
time, it vindicates the state interest in the equal protection of criminal
and civil rights laws. That normative advancement sacrifices the
process values of candor, openness, and fairness.
The normative costs of color-coded prosecutions leave race
conscious discretion as an alternative justification for reopening
abandoned race cases. Race-conscious discretion posits color as a key
constituent of sociolegal roles, relationships, and institutions. Sensitive
to the starkness of and gradations in color, race-conscious prosecutors
survey white offenders, black victims, and their assembled public and
private communities for signs of color consciousness. In this way, they

seek to reincorporate community into the prosecution function and

the criminal-justice process. Under race-conscious discretion, color
connects private lawbreaking and public responsibility. Admitting
collective responsibility and demonstrating contrition within white
offender communities and embracing the obligations of forgiveness
and showing mercy within black-victim communities link restorative
justice imperatives to the exercise of race-conscious discretion. That
linkage introduces a redemptive role for prosecutors in retrying cases
of racial violence.
Redemption-spurred restorative discretion in race cases is color
conscious. Discarding the pretense of colorblind claims and the pre
text of color-coded contentions, restorative discretion urges candor in
recollecting local histories of racial violence and in reconciling painful
differences of cross-racial community. Candor is tied to an open call
for offender atonement and victim mercy. That call fastens retributive
theories of punishment to redemption and reconciliation norms,
integrating offender contrition and victim forgiveness while mitigating
vengeance. Stitching retributive and restorative theories of punish
ment into a race-conscious model of lawyer discretion furnishes a
redemptive process for prosecutors sullied by decades-old failure and
decades-long neglect of criminal and civil rights cases. Redemption
requires the reconception of victim, offender, and community identity,

Retrying Race
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the translation of their private segregated narratives into public
empathic dialogues, and the revision of prosecutorial norms and prac
tices to engender cross-racial conversations and restorative collabora
tions.
To muster a redemptive appraisal of prosecutorial norms and prac
tices in retrying cases of white-on-black violence, the Essay will be
divided into five parts. Part I examines the place of race in law and
community. Part II outlines a genealogy of race cases and describes
the renewed prosecution of criminal and civil rights cases winnowed
from the 1950s and 1960s. Part III evaluates the standard conception
of prosecutorial discretion as a j ustification for retrying race cases.
Part IV analyzes the notion of race-conscious discretion as an alterna
tive j ustification. Part V assesses the idea of community-guided
restorative discretion as an additional j ustification. The Essay con

cludes with a reconsideration of prosecutorial ethics and community
norms in retrying cases of racial violence.
I.

RA CE I N LAW A N D COMMU NITY

Race colors law, crime, and community. It shadows the perform
ance of public and private roles. It shades the meaning of relation
ships. And it stains the operating norms of institutions. Narrowly
crafted, this Essay neither transforms the standard conceptions of

criminal-justice roles, relationships, and institutions, nor adjusts the
boundaries of colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious representa
tion. Instead, it parses the meaning of prosecutorial norms and their
function in the context of retrying previously abandoned cases of
white-on-black racial violence. The focal points of the analysis are race
and redemptive community.7
The subjects of race and community have gained increased atten
tion in legal theory and practice. Both the Critical Race Theory8 and

7. The themes of race and community unite the essays in this Colloquium. See Richard
Delgado, White Interests and Civil Rights Realism: Rodrigo's Bittersweet Epiphany, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1201 (2003); Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Jus
tice, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1225 (2003); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on
Trial - Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1269 (2003). For studies of racial reconciliation and redemption, see
HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN B LACKS
AND WHITES (1995), and ERIC K. yAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999):

8. See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997);
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancis eds., 2d
ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
(Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL
RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); see also ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE,
RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998); MIXED RACE AMERICA AND
THE LAW: A READER (Kevin R. Johnson ed., 2003).
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LatCrit9 movements proclaim... race as central to legal theory and
sociolegal studies. Likewise, both the community prosecution and
defender movementsro and the restorative j ustice movement11 declare
community as crucial to legal practice. Race and community seem
equally pivotal to adjudication.12 Yet academics, policymakers, and
practitioners (prosecutors, defenders, and j udges) remain at variance
in their appraisals of the normative value and sociolegal meaning of
race and community in the criminal-justice system.
Like the much-debated turn to norms and social meaning in recent
criminal-justice-policy research,13 this Essay challenges the standard

9. See Symposium, LatCrit: Latinas/as and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997), 10 LA
RAZA L.J. 1 (1 998); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of
Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997); see also THE LATINO/A
CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998).
10. The community prosecution movement encourages federal and state prosecutors to
collaborate with local governmental (e.g., police departments and criminal courts) and non
governmental (e.g., block associations and neighborhood groups) organizations in designing
innovative, community-based crime prevention and law enforcement initiatives. See Elaine
Nugent & Gerard A. Rainville, The State of Community Prosecution: Results of a National
Survey, PROSECUTOR, Mar./Apr. 2001 , at 26. By contrast, the community defender move
ment promotes multidisciplinary approaches to offender rehabilitation, off e ring individual
ized support services aimed at community reintegration. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Community
Prosecutors, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1465 (2002) [hereinafter Alfieri, Community Prosecutors]; Cait
Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the Conceptual and lnsti
llltiona/ Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 1 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 401 (2001);
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public De
fender, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 199 ( 1 999); Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a
Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (2002).

1 1. The restorative justice movement addresses both the agents and institutions of the
criminal-justice system, offering prosecutors, defe nders, and judges a dissonant ethos of vic
tim-centered offender punishment and offender-specific community restoration. Remarking
on this discord, Robert Cochran observes: "[Rjestorative justice takes the offender's crime
seriously and calls for repentance and restitution." Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Criminal De
fense Attorney: Roadblock or Bridge to Restorative Justice, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 2 1 1 , 213
(1999-2000); see also Frederick W. Gay, Restorative Justice and the Prosecutor, 27 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1651 (2000); Daniel W. Van Ness, New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges
of Restorative Justice, 4 CRIM. L.F. 251 (1993); Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Pros
pects for Restorative Justice in the United States (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). On the discordant sociology of punishment, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP
PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990), and

DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).
1 2. See Kathryn Abrams, Critical Strategy and the Judicial Evasion of Difference, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1426 (2000); Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct
and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000); Lis Wiehl, "Sound
ing Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereotyping, 18 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 185 (2002).
1 3. Compare Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 609 (1 998), and Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Or
der in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 805 (1998), with Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond
Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
1 70 (2000), and Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn ": Implications for Re
search Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 179 (2000), and Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus; Catt-
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adversarial conception of criminal-j ustice roles, relationships, and
institutions.14 Fundamentally, it contests the partisan, instrumental
tradition of prosecutor roles. Moreover, it disputes prosecutor rela
tionships with offenders, victims, and the state.15 Further, it questions
the function of race in prosecutor offices across advocacy, outreach,
and training. For each role, relationship, and institutional practice, the

Essay checks the construction of racial identity in prosecutor narra
tives, probing for signs of colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious
representation.
Like earlier interdisciplinary approaches to the study of race in
American law drawn from legal anthropology,16 history,17 and the law
and-society movement,18 the Essay views the social construction of
color in law as a means to understand racial ideology in culture and
society.19 The task is to gauge the colored discourses - spoken and

tionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
973 (2000).

14. On the standard adversarial conception of lawyering, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE: AN ErnICAL STUDY 50-103 (1988), and Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Mo
rality, in THE GOOD LAWYER 25-37 (David Luban ed., 1983).
15. Here, the term "state" is used interchangeably to refer to federal, state, and local
entities. The term implies government under the auspices of legislative, judicial, and execu
tive branches operating at national, state, and local levels.
1 6. See JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY
ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART (1988); JOHN COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF,
ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); CONTESTED
STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY AND RESISTANCE (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsh eds.,
1994); John L. Comaroff, The Discourse of Rights in Colonial South Africa: Subjectivity, Sov
ereignty, Modernity, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 193 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Keams eds., 1995); Carol J. Greenhouse, Courting Difference: Issues of Interpretation and
Comparison in the Study of Legal Ideologies, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 687 (1988); Sally Engle
Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 889 (1991 ).
17. See JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1 994); RACE ON TRIAL: LAW
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Annette Gordon-Reed ed., 2002); William w. Fisher
Ill, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHt.-KENT L. REV. 1051 (1993); Robert
W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J.
109 (1998); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
18. See RACE, LAW, & CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(Austin Sarat ed., 1997); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural
Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995).
19. On law and culture, see PAUL w. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999); THOMAS Ross, JUST STORIES: How TIIE
LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS ( 1 996); Paul Schiff Berman, The Cultural Life of Capital
Punishment: Surveying the Benefits of a Cultural Analysis of Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1129
(2002); Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1149 (1997); and Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis,
Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001).
See also Jessica M. Silbey, What We Do When We Do Law and Popular Culture, 27 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 139 (2002).
.
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unspoken - of prosecutors inscribed in the texts of criminal-justice
advocacy. My thesis, garnered from prior studies of death penalty and
poverty-law practice,20 is that color-tinged criminal-justice narratives
deform the public and private identity of offenders, victims, and their
allied communities.
By narrative I mean story, voiced descriptively or prescriptively.21
Akin to criminal-defense lawyers, prosecutors tell stories about law
and society.22 Everyday they talk of crime, the criminal law, and the
criminal-justice system. They talk in advocacy through opening
statements, direct examinations, and closing arguments at hearings,
trials, and appeals. Their talk, at once prosaic and metaphorical,
echoes in the texts of colloquies, memoranda, and opinions. By text I
mean both the physical record (transcript, brief, or order) and the
social context (law office, jail, or courthouse) of juridical speech and
conduct. The norms and meanings heard in these texts bear moral
consequence.
Liberal theory recognizes the moral import of juridical speech in
its oral, written, and symbolic figurations. The gravity of speech
gathers weight under feminist and critical race readings of law and
sociolegal relations. Derivative of liberalism, these readings depart
from pluralist tendencies toward neutrality and tolerance. For femi
nists, speech breaches neutrality in the· political economy of the
marketplace and the workplace, causing psychological and economic
harm. The harm may deform the identity of women, as in the case of
pornography, or silence the voice of women, as in the case of a hostile
work environment. Left unregulated, the aggressions of speech repro
duce gendered hierarchies of female submission.23 For critical race

20. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death
Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1996); Anthony V. Alfieri, Recon
structive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J 2107
(1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747 (1994) (re
viewing GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992)).
21. See LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1 996); LAW'S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
22. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.
C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996); Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative
Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994); David Dante Troutt, Screws,
Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality
Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18 (1999); see also Paul Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs and Stat
ues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inani
mate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 288 (1994).
23. See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 24-47 (The
Women's Press Ltd. 1981) (1979); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 206-13 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS
71-110 (1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
195-214 (1989); cf. NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX,
AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995).
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theorists, speech may strike blows against the body of the self and the
bond of community. The blows of hate speech strike especially hard.
Unimpeded by regulation, the individual and collective assaults of
derogatory speech fortify the lines of segregation.24
Modern in tone, the proffered readings of feminists and critical
race theorists concerning speech-induced injury extend under post
modern analysis as well. Keenly attentive to the identity grammar of
language, postmodern jurisprudence views the liberal subject
(offender or victim) as the product of interlocking public and private
discourses. For illustration, consider the victim-as-subject. For post
modernists, the very idea of the victim and the experience of victimi
zation are heavily contingent on the accretion of historical portrayals
in culture and society. These discourse-sketched portraits depict
images and convey meanings that describe and prescribe the behavior
expected of victims. Ingrained in the conscious and unconscious mind
and interwoven into society, the discourses - oral and written
histories - manufacture the character and perception of the victim in
the courtroom and in the world. The communication norms regulating
speech at these and other overlapping sites help mold in private
imagination and in public performance the stance of the victim toward
society and the posture of society toward the victim. This complex
interchange in no way forecloses agency: the subjective engagement
with, and intervention upon, the world outside the self. Freedom and
volition persist, albeit in an often highly structured space enclosed by
larger forces and material necessity.25
Both modem and postmodern liberal norms connect dignity to
personhood and liberty to agency. On this logic, when dignity is
diminished, personhood suffers. Similarly, when liberty is curbed by a
caste structure based on an immutable characteristic like race, the
freedom of agency,26 of self-intervention in the outside world, wanes
for individuals, for their affiliated groups, and for their local and even
national communities. To the extent that lawyer speech adversely

24. See MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Petal Nevella Modeste, Race
Hate Speech: The Pervasive Badge of Slavery that Mocks the Thirteenth Amendment, 44
HOWARD L.J. 3 1 1 (2001); Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of
Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283 (2000) .
25. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM
TO POSTMODERN ISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE (2000); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN
LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END (1995); PIERRE
SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
MIND 24 (1996).
26. On the moral agency of the subject in liberal legalism and feminist jurisprudence,
see Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1 169 (1998); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL
JUSTICE 55-80 (1999).
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affects the private self-worth or public caste-standing of participants
(offenders and victims) in the criminal-justice system, it demeans indi
vidual dignity and curtails collective liberty in society.
To be sure, neither the debasement of individual dignity nor the
constriction of collective liberty enacted by law or custom and
enforced by state or private action obliterates identity. For offenders
and victims, identity is too deep-rooted in its origins (for example,
family, faith, school) and too multifaceted in its dimensions (for
example, race, gender, class) to be easily upended or dismantled. But
identity may be damaged if ideological discourses are pernicious and
sociolegal conditions are oppressive. The damage is twofold. Dignity
may be so trampled that the integrity or intrinsic value of the wounded
person becomes discounted as negligible. At the same time, liberty
may be so constrained in the spheres of economic exchange, social
intercourse, and political participation that the status of the person or
group becomes derided as marginal.27
The ideology-driven white racial violence of the 1950s and 1960s,
coupled with the repressive regulation of Jim Crow laws, inflicted
widespread damage on black communities throughout the South.28
The damage exceeded simple injury and death to exact both dignitary
and stigma harm. Rationalized by habits of discourse and reinforced
by the force of law and vigilante violence, the harm belittled black
racial dignity, negating the integrity of individual citizens and the
value of whole communities. Deemed naturally or necessarily sub
ordinate in commerce, culture, and civic governance, the same harm
cabined black liberty, relegating black citizens to the status of eco
nomic marginality, social inferiority, and political disenfranchisement.
The resurgent prosecution of crimes of racial violence committed
nearly a half century ago affords an occasion to reconsider the opera
tion of the criminal-justice system in repairing the degradation of
black dignitary and liberty interests. Reconsideration entails the appli
cation of a retrospective and contextual ethical valence, a valence that
shifts backward and forward to explain prosecutorial inaction or

27. See JOEL F. HANDLER, LAw AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY ( 1990); William
H. Simon, Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy: Identity Politics, Bad Faith, and In
determinacy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
49 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999) [hereinafter DELIBERATIVE POLITICS] ; Iris Marion Young,
Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
102 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); Iris Marion Young, Difference as a Re
source for Democratic Communication, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS 383 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1 997); Iris Marion
Young, Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra,
at 151.
28. See JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
MISSISSIPPI (1994); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY,
1890-2000 (2001); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 1954-1980
( 1 981).
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failure when crimes of racial violence go unpunished and to justify
prosecutorial action when such crimes undergo penalty. It is precisely
this search for justification that drives the present inquiry.
At first blush, justification for the resurgent prosecution of cases of
white-on-black racial violence years after their disparate criminal acts
and their subsequently aborted or failed trials seems apparent. It is a
justification rooted in the regularly intoned belief in a protean politics

of race. Applicable to both southern and northern precincts, this vague
incantation suggests that accumulated decades of emancipatory
changes in American culture and society, joined by coextensive
transformations in politics and economics, gradually liberated prose
cutors to renew their campaign against racially motivated violence.
Put aside for the moment that the historical record furnishes scant
evidence of a prosecutor-mounted anti-terror campaign.29 In fact,
taken as a whole, the cases discussed here display small semblance of
cohesion or organization. Scattered across numerous states and varied
factual landscapes, they resemble the diffuse product of ad hoc deci
sionmaking, rather than the regimented logic of an egalitarian crusade.
Despite this erratic record and the ambiguity of redemption, the
politics of race theorem casts prosecutors not only as redeemers, but
also as prisoners. Imprisoned by history, their revelation to take up the
cause of freedom comes late. History, however, is a multifarious
warden. It dictates through state functionaries, among them legisla
tors, judges, administrators, and sheriffs. It disciplines through evolv
ing cultural and social mores.
Casting prosecutors as captive cultural and social artifacts or
reflexive state instruments is troubling. Even at a glance, the account
seems deterministic. It supplies crude treatments of agency and causa
tion. More disquieting, the account seems tied by a strand of legal
nihilism. It denigrates the role of law, professional norms, and legal
ethics in guiding the prosecution function. Neither of these observa
tions is meant to deny the force of culture and society or the power of
the political arm of the state to twist prosecutorial decisionmaking.
But no ideology banishes choice. And no state, acting through the
delegated powers of legislatures, courts, and enforcement agencies, is
omnipotent. Both impress freedom and constraint on the office of the
prosecutor.
Mired in liberalism and its heralded autonomy of law, this Essay
rejects an untrammeled politics of race justification for the resurgent

29. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 43-44, 10113 (1985); BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1997); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE
AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and
the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 3942 (1996).
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prosecution of white-on-black racial violence. In fairness, the rejection
is only partial. It acknowledges the influence of culture, society, and
political economy on the prosecutor's station. Furthermore, it admits
the potency of the state's grip on that station. Nonetheless, it balks at
the suggestion that law and the norms of the profession hold no sway
over the discharge of the prosecutor's duties. The duties may be
circumscribed and the norms corrupted, yet they enter into the daily
calculus of prosecutorial discretion in race cases. The task is to
ascertain the capacity of such norms, and their corresponding ethical
precepts, to infiltrate the race-besieged consciousness of prosecutors
at the midpoint and at the turn of the century. The path into lawyer
consciousness leads to discretion. Here, that path is bordered by color.
The idea of color pervades American law and the criminal-justice
system. It suffuses advocacy and adjudication as well as legislation and
law enforcement. Its boundary lines shift, sometimes detectable, some
times coded. The notion of colorblind representation resonates deeply
in the process-oriented constitutional jurisprudence of the criminal
law,30 appealing to a sense of neutrality, procedural fairness, and even
handed justice.31 The notion of color-coded representation, in
comparison, evokes an instrumental, result-oriented jurisprudence of
subterfuge, entailing covert stratagem, veiled motive, and pretext.32 By
contrast, the notion of color-conscious representation invokes a
remedial, egalitarian jurisprudence of restoration and reparation,
broadly applicable to the fields of education,33 employment,34 and

30. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992). For a critique of
colorblind neutrality, see MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, JUSTICE BLIND: IDEALS AND REALITIES
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2002), and Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of
the law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88
CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000).

31. On procedural fairness as justice, see JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS (Samuel
Freeman ed., 1999); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001), and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed., 1999).
32. See BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE
CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW (1998); Peggy c. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 y ALE L.J.
1559 (1989); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1 161
(1 995); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).

33. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanie, California's Racial History and Constitutional
Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1521 (2000) ; Paul Diller, Note, Integration Without Classification: Moving Toward Race
Neutrality in the Pursuit of Public Elementary am/ Secondary School Diversity, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1 999 (2001).
34. See John Cocchi Day, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections on a
Decade of Federal Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2001).
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voting.35 To better understand the classifications of colored discourse
in criminal law and advocacy, consider the category of race cases.
II.

RAC E CASES

Race cases provide a categorical site for the intersection of law,
culture, and society. The current prosecution of decades-old criminal
and civil rights cases for long-neglected racial wrongs demarcates one
such site. From an antebellum starting point, the trials preserve ele
ments of the Middle Passage history of race in the law of slavery. This
history chronicles the common law of contract, tort, and property, and
the criminal law of slave codes.36 From a postbellum perspective, the
trials extend traces of the Reconstruction history of race in the law of
emancipation. This history records the conjunction of statutory
freedoms, common-law privileges, and criminal-law proscriptions.37
Under both antebellum and postbellum regimes, the trials of race
cases mirror the surrounding culture, politics, and sociology of race.
Indeed, the law of race is shaped by, and in turn shapes, the culture,
political economy, and social structure of race.
A.

A Genealogy of Race Cases

The history of race cases spans more than two centuries of
American law.38 The task of surveying such wide-ranging cases

35. See Mark Crain, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting: An Empirical
Analysis, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (2001); John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie; A re Ra
cial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan
Gerrymanders, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489 (2002).
36. See ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER: SLAVERY ANO MASTERY IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN COURTROOM (2000); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 1724 (2001); Ariela J. Gross, " Like Master, Like Man": Constructing Whiteness in
the Commercial Law of Slavery, 1800-1861, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 263 (1996); Thomas D.
Russell, A New Image of the Slave Auction: An Empirical Look at the Role of Law in Slave
Sales and a Conceptual Reevaluation ofSlave Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 473 (1996).
37. See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT I N
THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984); ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM:
EMANCIPATION AND ITS LEGACY (1983); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO
FREEDOM (1967); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only as an En
emy": The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum
Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969 (1992); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the White
ness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract
Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269 (1994); see also Florence Wagman Roisman, The Impact of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 on Racially Discriminatory Donative Transfers, 53 ALA. L. REV. 463
(2002).
38. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (4th ed. 2001);
MICHAEL F. HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND QUESTIONS (2001);
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan F. Perea et al.
eds., 2000).
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embroils the idea and historiography of race.39 N o attempt will be
made here to settle those controversies or to compile a comprehensive
catalogue of race cases. However laudable, such endeavors exceed the
grasp of this Essay. Instead, the idea of race and the history of its
prosecution will be tapered to reported accounts of black victims of
white violence during a roughly ten-year period of the mid-twentieth
century. Earlier periods inform these accounts, notably the colonial,40
Reconstruction,41 and Jim Crow42 eras. In the same way, antecedent
cultural and social conditions animate the character of the accounts.43
The conditions impact upon the gendered and ethnic composition of
racial identity, the form of racialized narrative, and the racial content
of crime and criminal justice.44
Against that backdrop, the inclusion of civil disputes, criminal
prosecutions, and civil rights proceedings in a catalogue of race cases,
while appropriate, overtaxes this inquiry. Unsurprisingly, the civil
cases of paramount interest stem predominantly from nineteenth
century slave-holding disputes under contract, tort, and property law.45

39. See CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, RACIAL VIOLENCE ON TRIAL (2001); RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION AND HISTORY (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997).
40. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR - RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); ALDEN T. VAUGHAN,
ROOTS OF AMERICAN RACISM: ESSAYS ON THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 128-74 (1995);
ALBERT J. VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF ANTHONY BURNS: FREEDOM AND SLAVERY IN
EMERSON'S BOSTON ( 1 998).

4 1. See EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER
RECONSTRUCTION ( 1 993); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL
WAR (1994); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1982); see
also RICHARD PAUL FUKE, IMPERFECT EQUALITY: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE
CONFINES OF WHITE RACIAL ATTITUDES IN POST-EMANCIPATION MARYLAND (1999); AT
FREEDOM'S DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN
RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA (James Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis Burke, Jr.
eds., 2000).
42. See c. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966); see also
STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (1988);
Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career ofJim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the "Sepa
rate but Equal" Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM. J. LEGAL H IST. 17 (1984).
43. See FRANKIE Y. BAILEY & ALICE P. GREEN, "LAW NEVER HERE": A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN RESPONSES TO ISSUES OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (1999);
Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 640 (2001 ).
44. See KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS
PATRIARCHS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA ( 1 996); CARL
GUTIERREZ-JONES, CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES: A STUDY OF RACE, RHETORIC AND
INJURY (2001 ); RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A
TROUBLESOME WORD (2002); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO
FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003); ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ( 1 995); Randall L. Kennedy, "Nigger! " as a Problem in the Law,
20(Jl ILL. L. REV. 935.
45. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS ( 1 975); ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF
SLAVERY IN Two AMERICAN CENTURIES ( 1 998).
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The disputes determine the meaning of skin color and the norms of
racial status.46 Contemporary civil and criminal cases equally engage
color47 and status.48 Civil rights cases, branching out from postbellum
constitutional amendments and federal statutes, also confront domi
nant stereotypes and status distinctions.49
The social construction of color is basic to race-contaminated civil,
criminal, and civil rights proceedings.50 The process of construction
occurs through the identity-making discourses of racial difference and
hierarchy.51 Difference, manifested in identity and culture, provokes
the separation of division. Preserving the divisions and exclusions of
hierarchy demands an abiding consciousness of race. Consciousness
hinges on the reproduction of identity and narrative.
Stirred by interracial animus, race cases highlight the symbolic
authority of racial identity and the rhetorical power of racialized
narratives. Acts of bigotry and violence erupt out of identity distinc
tions based on status and narrative rationales. The distinctions rest on
axioms of black moral and cultural inferiority deduced from
antebellum principles of racial hierarchy as well as ingrained habits of
subordinating construction.52 The hierarchies depend on dominant and
subordinate socioeconomic ranking. Race-based status distinctions

46. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nine
teenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); see also Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A
Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705 (2000); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The
Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000); Judith Kelleher Schafer, "Under the Present
Mode of Trial, Improper Verdicts Are Very Often Given": Criminal Procedure in the Trials of
Slaves in Antebellum Louisiana, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 635 (1996).
47. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping ofIdentity, 88 CAL. L. REV. 41
(2000) ; Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Ala
bama, 1890-1934, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 225 (2002); see also Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against
the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1 241 (2002).
48. See Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and
Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45 (1998); Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense
Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1994).
49. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Federal Enforcement of Civil Rights During the First Re
construction, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155 (1995); Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State
and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 509 (1994); see also Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in
Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1 567 (1989).
50. See A. LEON H IGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996); IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE
BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 1 1 1 -53 (1996); Ian F. Haney L6pez, The So
cial Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
5 1. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures
of Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1 1 (2001); Kim Benita Fu
rumoto, Boundaries of the Racial State: Two Faces of Racist Exclusion in United States Law,
17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85 (2001 ).
52 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000);
STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001 ).
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and
hierarchies pervade the laws, legal institutions, and sociolegal relations
of the criminal-justice system.53 The laws of criminal codes and proce
dure indulge race.54 The offices of federal and state prosecutors exploit
it.55 Even the relationships between the prosecutor and victim, and
conversely, the criminal defender and offender, mull its consequence.56
Racial identity lies at the core of hierarchies in the laws, institu
tions, and relations of advocacy and adjudication. Identity is carved
into seemingly immutable stereotypes.57 In the civil-and-criminal
justice system, stereotypes warp symbols and skew speech. Advancing
case-by-case, the stereotypes privilege unequal configurations of
public and private rights and duties. Accrued over time, they infect
constitutional interpretation, statutory construction, and common law
adjudication.58

S3. On racial hierarchies in the criminal-justice system, see JEROME G. M I LLER,
SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(1996); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR,
BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998);
David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era:
An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1638 (1998); David Cole, Foreword, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 10S9, 1074-82 (1999);
Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law: The Relationship
Between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in So11them
Antebellum and Motlern Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 116S, 1 184-96, 1199-1204,
120S-46 (199S); and Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, am/ Racial Discrimination:
A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 12SS (1994). See generally Note, Constitutional Risks to
Equal Protection in the Criminal Justice System, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2098 (2001); Develop
ments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472 (1988).
S4. On racial status distinctions in the criminal law, see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 10S YALE L.J. 677 (199S); Devon
W. Carbado, (£)racing the Fourth Amemlment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Color of Trllth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L.
261 (1996); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, Sl VAND. L.
REV. 333 (1998); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1283 (199S); and Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 9S6 (1999).
SS. On prosecutorial exploitation of race in federal and state forums, see Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1044-4S (2003) (citing statistical and historical evidence of racial
discrimination in jury selection by Dallas County, Texas, prosecutors, including an office
wide "culture of discrimination"); and Drew S. Days Ill, Race and the Federal Criminal Jus
tice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Proseclltion, 48 ME. L. REV. 180 (1996).
S6. See Elizabeth L. Earle, Banishing the Thirteenth Jnror: An Approach to the Identifi
cation of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1992); M. Shanara Gilbert, An
Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional Prescription for Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive
Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 18SS (1993); Andrea D. Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A
Proposal for Handling Prosec11torial Appeals to Racial, Ethnic or Gender Prejudice During
Trial, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 319 (2001 ).
S7. See Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 137S (1999).
S8. See MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN
OF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM (1999); Pam-
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The colors of black and white dominate racial stereotypes. Forged
from antebellum and postbellum categories, the colors erect and
reproduce a dichotomy of black guilt and white innocence. This
dichotomy is integral to the narrative form and substance of criminal
and civil rights disputes.59 It produces false public pronouncements of
black culpability and hollow proclamations of white virtue. These
mixed declarations of law and fact carry their own logic and bring
internal coherence to race cases.
The law itself maps the initial contours of race cases. Traced here,
the substantive doctrines of criminal and civil rights law inject race
into the methods of law enforcement, the strategies of advocacy, and

the standards of adjudication. Consider, for example, racial profiling60
and hate crimes.61 Racial profiling affects law enforcement and charg
ing. Hate crimes impact upon indictment and sentencing. The proce
dural rules of federal and state practice also interpose race into the
tactics of advocacy and the iterations of judicial rulings. Consider, for
instance, the continuing furor over equality interests in criminal pro
cedure and jury selection. Equality issues vex suppression hearings
and capital sentencing schemes.62 Equal or fair representation issues
rankle judges in reviewing jury peremptory challenges.63
eta S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal A djudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001
(1998); William G. Ross, The Constitutional Significance of the Scottsboro Cases, 28 CUMB.
L. REV. 591 (1997-1998).
59. On the blacklwhite dichotomy in criminal and civil rights narratives, see RICHARD
DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE
164-89 (1995); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1616-51 (1985); and Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence
and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1990). See also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS,
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
60. See Brandon Garrett, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling
Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815 (2000) ; Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial
Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000) ; Samuel R. Gross &
Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002); Gregory
M. Lipper, Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 551 (2001); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With
an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Pro
filing, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409 (2000) .

61. See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
HATE CRIMES (2002); JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTIER, H ATES CRIMES: CRIMINAL
LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS (1998); VALERIE JENNESS, MAKINO HATE A CRIME: FROM
SOCIAL MOVEMENT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT (2001 ); BARBARA PERRY, IN THE NAME OF
HATE: UNDERSTANDING HATE CRIMES (2001); see also Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate
Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 1227 (2000) .
62. See Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal
Procedures: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359 (2001);
Lewis R. Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in A merica, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 471, (2001).
63. See Samuel R. Gross, Race, Peremptories, and Capital Jury Deliberations, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 283 (2001); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A
Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (1997); see also Robin Charlow, Tolerating
Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 21-27, 31-40 (1997); Susan
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The race of judges and the racial composition of juries also demar
cate race cases. For judges, racial biography may sway findings of fact
and conclusions of law in formalist and instrumental directions, as
demonstrated in slave code and civil rights enforcement.64 For juries,
racial biography may tilt evidentiary weighing and legal deliberation,
as shown in jury nullification.65 Race-tainted cognitive prisms may
afflict parties, victims, and lawyers as well. The racial identity of
parties rouses client-lawyer and client-community tensions.66 Victim
identity induces strain over prosecutorial abuse and bias, as seen in
protests about revictimization, victims' rights, and victim impact
statements.67 Lawyer-racial identity, as counsel and as adversary,68 also
mediates criminal and civil rights cases, as the divergent history of the
profession and the black bar prove.69 Taken together, these markings
indicate the external form and internal structure of race cases.70

N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness,
and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture
(Not to Say Race) ofPeremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 (1993); Kenneth J.
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Chal
lenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996).
64. See J.W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JuDGES AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION (1978); LINN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE (1994); Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Civil Rights Lawyers on the Bench, 91 YALE L.J. 814 (1982) (reviewing JACK
BASS: UNLIKELY HEROES (1981)); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity,
Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997).
65. See Long X. Do, Jury Nullification and Race-Conscious Reasonable Doubt: Overlap
ping Reifications of Commonsense Justice and the Potential Voir Dire Mistake, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1843 (2000); Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: De
bating Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815 (2001); see
also Walter Rugaber, Trial of 18 Charged with Conspiracy in Mississippi Goes to All-White
Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1967, at 37.
66. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-93 (1976); Clark D. Cunningham,
The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Dis
course, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients:
Thinking About Law As Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman,
Speaking Truth to Power: The Language ofCivil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE LJ. 763 (1995).
67. See Katie Long, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Re
venge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187 (1995); Walker A. Matthews, III, Proposed Victims' Rights
Amendment: Ethical Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
735 (1998); Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings, 15
SOC. JUST. RES. 313 (2002).
68. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLINICAL L.
REV. 9 (1994); Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys
and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766 (1997); David B. Wilkins, Identi
ties and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502
(1998); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995); see also Bernie D. Jones,
Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 18 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (2002); Elaine R. Jones & Jaribu Hill, Contemporary Civil Rights
Struggle: The Role of Black Attorneys, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 185 (1999-2000) .
69. See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER
1844-1944, at 541-610 (1993); Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early
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B.

The Reprosecution of Race Cases

The race cases in this preliminary study are culled fr<;>m a score of
criminal and civil rights p roceedings in both northern and southern
courts. For the northern states - Indiana and Pennsylvania - the
cases arose late in the history of black industrial migration.71 Fot the
southern states - Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi - the cases
emerged during the middle period of the evolution of the New South.72
Like earlier postbellum incidents of lynching,73 many of the cases grew
out of vigilante forms of private violence variously aided or condoned
by state agents. Precipitated by virulent opposition to the civil rights
movement, the cases often attracted national attention.74
The violence engulfing the civil rights movement and spawning the
proceedings at issue here illustrates the· historical bonds of race, law,
and community. Those bonds are forged in the trial and retrial of race
cases under the aegis of prosecutorial discretion. In the criminal
justice system, both easy and hard cases are products of discretion.
Although bounded by Jim Crow laws and customs (all-white juries
and witness reprisals), the cases are manufactured from familiar mate
rials: physical evidence and witness testimony of white-on-black vio
lence. Easy cases rediscover omitted and suppressed evidentiary mate
rials. Hard cases reweigh neglected criminal-justice norms in parsing
extant evidence. For examples of evidence-driven easy cases, consider
the histories of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing, Medgar
Evers, Vernon Dahmer, Carol Jenkins, and Lillie Belle Allen.
Turn first to the 1963 bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist
Church in Birmingham, Alabama.75 On Sunday morning, September

NAA CP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. IJ7 (2002); David B. Wilkins, Comment, Class
Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why Hierarchy Makes Strange Bedfellows, 20 LAW & HIST.

REV. 147 (2002).
70. For an initial mapping of race case genealogy, see Alfieri, Race
at 1305-23.

Trials, supra

note 1,

71. See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION
AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991).
72.

See C. VANN WOODWARD, 0RIGINS OFTHE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (1951).

73. See W. FrrzHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND
VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993); PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE
LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA (2002); STEWART E. TOLNAY & E.M BECK, A FEsTIVAL
OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930 (1995); GEORGE C.
WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE, AND
"LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1990).
.

74. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL
VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH (1987); Michal R.
Belknap, The Vindication of Burke Marshall: The Southern Legal System and the Anti-Civil
Rights Violence ofthe 1960s, 33 EMORY L.J. 93 (1984).
75. See DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA - THE
CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE ClvIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2001 ).

.

1160

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1141

15, 1963, a bomb exploded in the basement of the Sixteenth Street
Baptist Church, killing four children, ages eleven to fourteen: Denise
McNair, Carole Robertson, Cynthia Wesley, and Addie Mae Collins.
Hindered by the FBI, state and federal prosecutors failed to marshal
indictments. In 1971, Alabama prosecutors reopened the case and in
1977 indicted Klansman Robert E. Chambliss, citing the inculpatory
testimony of Chambliss's niece. An Alabama court convicted
Chambliss and sentenced him to prison where he died in 1985.76 In

1995, at the urging of the Birmingham-black community, the FBI
reopened its controversial investigation. In 2000, state and federal

prosecutors indicted Klansmen Thomas E. Blanton, Jr. and Bobby
Frank Cherry.77 Alabama courts held Cherry mentally incompetent to
stand trial but convicted Blanton of first-degree murder.78
Similarly, consider the 1963 murder of Medgar Evers, a thirty
seven-year-old NAACP Field Secretary, in Belzoni, Mississippi. On
the night of June 12, 1963, Evers was shot in the back outside his
home. Mississippi prosecutors indicted Klansman Byron De La
Beckwith for the murder. Two 1964 trials ended in mistrials. In 1990,
upon public disclosure of suspected jury tampering gleaned from
Mississippi Sovereignty Commission records, prosecutors reindicted
Beckwith. The trial court convicted Beckwith; he died in prison.79

76. See Drummond Ayres Jr., 'Amens' at Church in Birmingham Are Loud After
Bombing Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1977, at 24; Wayne King, Indictments Recall Terror
of Birmingham Sunday in 1963, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1977, at 18; Alabama Does Right by
Martyrs, HARTFORD COURANT, May 6, 2001, at C2; Ex-Klansman Indicted in '63 Bombing
That Killed 4, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1977, at 20; FBI Agents Honored for Helping Solve 1963
Church Bomb Case, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at Al9.
77. See Marlon Manuel, Church Bombing Trial Aims for Healing: Progressive Prosecu
tor, Nagging Consciences and New Power Structures Try to Make Up for Decades of Delays,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 23, 2001, at Al; Marlon Manuel, Church Bombing Trial 'Worth
the Wait', ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 23, 2001, at A6; Janita Poe, Birmingham Bombing Vic
tims: Church Bomber Guilty, at Last, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 23, 2002, at Al; Janita Poe,
Revisiting 'Bombingham '; Birmingham Aims Marketing Campaign Within City Limits as 39year-old Trial Reawakens Lingering Doubts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 11, 2002, at Al
[hereinafter Poe, Revisiting 'Bombingham ']; Tatsha Robertson, Righting Our Uncivilized
Wrongs: Reopened Race Murder Cases May Yet Add Justice to an Era, BOSTON GLOBE, May
6, 2001 , at El; Kevin Sack, An Alabama Prosecutor Confronts the Burden of History, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2001, at AS; Cynthia Tucker, In Birmingham, Justice ls Late for Four Little.
Girls, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 21, 2000, at BS.
78. See Marlon Manuel, Church Bombing Verdict: Justice Served, FBI Man Says; Ex
Klansman Guilty in 37-year-old Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 2, 2001, at lA; Poe, Revis
iting 'Bombingham, ' supra note 77; Howell Raines, The Birmingham Bombing, N.Y. IlMES,
July 24, 1983, §6 (Magazine), at 12; Stephanie Saul, FBI Outreach Led to Bombing Arrests,
NEWSDA y' May 19, 2000, at A6.
79. See BOBBY DELAUGIITER, NEVER Too LATE: "A PROSECUTOR'S STORY OF
JUSTICE IN THE MEDGAR EVERS CASE (2001); MARYANNE VOLLERS, GHOSTS OF
MISSISSIPPI: THE MURDER OF MEDGAR EVERS, THE TRIALS OF BYRON DE LA BECKWITH,
AND THE HAUNTING OF THE NEW SOUTH (1995); Todd Taylor, Exorcising the Ghosts of a
Shameful Past: The Third Trial and Conviction of Byron De La Beckwith, 16 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 359 (1996) (reviewing VOLLERS, supra); Christina Cheakalos, Around the
South: No Big Breaks in Old Racial Slayings: Beckwith Case Seen as a Rarity, ATLANTA J.-
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Likewise, consider the 1966 murder of Vernon Dahmer, a grocery
store owner and the President of the Harrisburg, Mississippi, NAACP.
On January 10, 1 966, Klansmen firebombed Dahmer's house at night.
He died of smoke inhalation after exchanging gunfire with Klansmen,
enabling his family to escape. Mississippi prosecutors indicted
Klansman Sam Bowers for the murder. At trial, Mississippi juries
twice acquitted Bowers. Prosecutors also indicted William Smith for
the murder. Smith's first state trial ended in a hung jury amid charges
of jury tampering. A second state trial court convicted Smith and
sentenced him to prison. In 1998, again following public disclosure of
Mississippi Sovereignty Commission evidence, prosecutors reindicted
Bowers. A third Mississippi trial court convicted Bowers and sen
tenced him to life imprisonment.80
Further, consider the 1968 murder of Carol Jenkins, a twenty-one
year-old aspiring model, in Martinsville, Indiana. On September 16,
1968, Jenkins was stabbed to death while selling encyclopedias door
to-door. An Indiana police investigation failed to name a suspect or
make an arrest. On May 8, 2002, based on new evidence supplied by a
child eyewitness, state prosecutors indicted Kenneth Clay Richmond
for murder. Indiana courts held Richmond incompetent to stand trial;
he died in jail.81
CONST., Feb. 10, 1994, at A3; Willa J. Conrad, One Man's Stand: Medgar Evers' [sic) Hero
ism Unleashes a Composer's Imagination, STAR-LEDGER (New Jersey), Mar. 4, 2002, at 21;
Anne �ochell Konigsmark, Civil Wrongs; Pressure Builds to Reopen the Unsolved Murders
of Rights A ctivists in I960s, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 21, 1999, at Ml ; Adam Nossiter, As
South Changes, Civil Rights Murders Being Probed Anew: Thirst for Justice Can 't Be Buried
by the Decades, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 19, 1989, at Dl; Adam Nossiter, 27 Years
Later, Evers Slaying Gets Another Look, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 15, 1990, at A3; John
Shearer, Civil Rights Era Cases Endure; As Prosecutors Pursue Justice Decades Later, the
Wife ofa Man Convicted for a Notorious Crime 1963 Murder Calls Him Innocent, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Sept. 7, 2000, at Cl; Editorials: South Atoning for Racist Murders, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Nov. 10, 1999, at A18; see also De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 554-65
(Miss. 1997).
80. See John Gibeaut, Confronting a Dark Past, 84 A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 26; J. Whyatt
Mondesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & Civ.
RTS. L. REV. 435, 440-41 (2001); Rick Bragg, Jurors Convict Former Wizard in Klan Murder,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at Al; Jerry Mitchell, Evers Case Opened Doors, CLARION·
LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), May 26, 2002, at Al; Earnest Reese, Prosecutors to Re-Examine
Activist's Slaying; Klan Implicated: The Slaying of Vernon Dahmer in Mississippi 29 Years
Ago Brought Four Convictions, But Some Say More Needs to Be Done, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Apr. 9, 1995, at A3; Anne Rochell, Racial Slaying: New Trial Reopens Bitter Era, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Aug. 17, 1998, at Al; Peter Scott & Andy Miller, A Beginning: Racist Killings Re
opened: New Probes Spark Hopes for Justice, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 3, 1991, at Al6;
Alan Sverdlik, A ctivist's Family Renews Call for Trials: Vernon Dahmer Was Killed in 1966,
But His Case Isn't Dead, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 1, 1995, at B5; see also Rick Bragg,
Memories of a Deadly Assault in 1 996 Are Reawakened at Klan Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1998, at Al6; Mike Williams, Focus on Sovereignty Commission: Files Might Provide Some
Peace, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 18, 1998, at B2.

81. See Dick Kaukas, S. Indiana City 's Residents Want Racist Image Relegated to Past,
COURIER J. (Louisville), July 1 , 2002, at Al; Mike Ellis, Decades-Old Case Challenges Sys
tem, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 28, 2002, at Al; Sharon Jenkins & Anare V. Holmes, Justice
for Carol Jenkins,

a Human

Being: Martyred Girl
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Thousands of Lives,
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Finally, consider the 1969 murder of Lillie Belle Allen, a twenty
seven-year-old mother of two children, in York, Pennsylvania. On July
21, 1969, armed white-gang members shot Allen when her car stalled
in a white neighborhood during a race riot. York police officers failed
to conduct a thorough investigation or survey eyewitnesses. Decades
later, officers pursuing a related investigation discovered overlooked
witness testimony and forensic evidence. On that evidence,
Pennsylvania prosecutors indicted ten white gang members; nine have
received sentences - seven under plea agreements.82
Admittedly abridged, these five case histories highlight the
evidence-specific quality of easy cases in the reprosecution of race
trials. That quality, however, is misleading. Indeed, to mention the
relevance of suppressed FBI reports and government documents, or to
cite omitted eyewitness testimony and forensic findings, obscures a
more basic normative point. Plainly, such evidentiary material is rele
vant to the prosecution or reprosecution of race cases. But deploying
that material to advance the remedial purposes of reprosecution is a
normative undertaking. Prosecutorial discretion in reprosecuting race
cases is precisely such an undertaking. It is the normative threshold of
race case reprosecutions: hard and easy. Exercising the required
judgment entailed in crossing the threshold may undermine the dis
tinction posed here. Easy cases in fact may prove to be a kind of
stalking horse. Their pursuit seems to collapse into the same judg
ments demanded of hard cases. Put differently, to the extent that all
race cases involve a crucible of judgment, easy cases may be distin
guished chiefly by their post hoc rationale: old evidence newly discov
ered. For examples of more generalizable, norm-driven hard cases,

INDIANAPOLIS RECORDER, June 7, 2002, at Al; Don Terry, 34 Years Later, Sad Secret Sur
faces; Childhood Memory May Solve Slaying, CHI. TRIB., May, 12, 2002, at 1; Seeking Justice,
Decades Later, HARTFORD COURANT, May 20, 2002, at A6; cf. Bruce C. Smith, Murder Sus
pect Dies of Cancer, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 1 , 2002, at A1 (noting that Richmond died
in a state mental-health facility).
S2. See Russ Crenshaw, Search for Hope Continues in York 25 Years After Violence of
1969: The Riots Ripped the City Apart. In Some Places, the Wounds Remain Open, YORK
DAILY R ECORD, Aug. 4, 1994, at Al; Rick Lee & Teresa Ann Boeckel, Slick Sent to Prison:
He Was the Ninth Man Sentenced in the 1969 Killing of Lillie Belle Allen, YORK DAILY REC.,
May 29, 2003, at AS; Marc Levy, Man Pleads Guilty in 1969 Killing: It's 6th Plea Bargain in
Pa. Race-Riot Slaying of Black Woman, 27, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 30, 2002, at Al4;
Jim Lynch et al., Verdict Writes History: Jurors' Decision Brings the County's Most Famous
Case Since the Hex Trial to an End, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 21, 2002, at All; Timothy D.
May, City Faces Racial Killings 3 Decades Later, TIMES UNION (Albany), Sept. 24, 2000, at
A25; Timothy D. May, Pennsylvania City Confronts 2 Racial Killings 31 Years Later Justice:
A Mob Killed a Black Woman Days After a White Policeman was Slain in York. No One Was
Ever Charged in Either Death, But Cases A re Being Reopened, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at
A3; Background: Race Riots, '68 and '69, YORK DAILY REC., Sept. 26, 2000, at A7; Four
Admit Guilt in '69 York Race Killings, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 15, 2002, at 9; Guilty Pleas
Begin a Time of Healing: The Book on the 1 969 Riots Can Begin to Close, as Four Men did
the Right Thing by Admilling Guilt, YORK DAILY REC., Aug. J S, 2002, at 2; Opinion: Murder
Case Full ofChoices, YORK DAILY REC., Dec. 20, 2001, at AS.
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consider the histories of Harry and Harriet Moore; Willie Edwards,
Jr.; the Bethel Baptist Church bombing; Michael Schwemer, Andrew
Goodman, and James Chaney; Oneal Moore; Ben Brown; Ben Ches
ter White; Rainey Pool; Henry Hezekiah Dee and Charles Eddie
Moore; and Wharlest Jackson.
Turn first to the earliest of these cases, the 1951 murders of Harry
and Harriette Moore in Mims, Florida. On December 25, 1951, a
bomb exploded under the bedroom of the Moore's small wood frame
house,

killing

Harry,

a NAACP

activist,

and

gravely

injuring

Harriette, who died eight days later. An FBI investigation of the Klan
in Orange County, Florida, and a 1952 federal grand jury in Miami
produced perjury indictments in 1953 but no arrests. Florida officials
subsequently reopened the investigation in 1978 and 1991, finally
closing the case in April 1992 for lack of evidence.83
Tum next to the 1957 murder of Willie Edwards, Jr., a twenty-five
year-old black truck driver in Montgomery, Alabama. Edwards failed
to return home from work on January 23, 1957. In April of 1957,
fishermen found Edwards's decomposed body in the. Alabama River.
Notwithstanding suspicions of a Ku Klux Klan abduction, state
officials ruled the death an accident by drowning because of insuffi
cient evidence. In 1976, the state attorney general opened a homicide
investigation and indicted three Montgomery Klansmen for murder:
William Kyle Livingston, Jr. , Henry Alexander, and James Y ork. The
indictment accused the Klansmen of forcing Edwards to leap to his
death from the Tyler Goodwin Bridge on January 23, 1957 for
allegedly m aking advances toward a white woman. Despite Britt's
grand jury testimony, bargained in exchange for immunity, an
Alabama court twice dismissed the indictment for lack of a specific
cause of death. In 1992, near death, Alexander confessed to the
murder. Pressed by the Edwards family to reopen the investigation, in
1997 prosecutors exhumed Edwards's body, officially ruled his death a
homicide, and recon vened a grand jury to seek a second murder
indictment. In 1999, the grand jury failed to return an indictment.84

83. See BEN GREEN, BEFORE HIS TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HARRY T. MOORE,
AMERICA'S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MARTYR (1 999); Philip Morgan, The Martyr, TAM PA
TRIB., Nov. 5, 2000, at 1; Ormund Powers, Book Revives Debate About Fatal Christmas 1 951
Bombing, LAKE TRIB., May 19, 1999, at 3; Harry Wessel, Civil Rights Leader Gets His Due,
ORLANDO SENTINELTRIB., Aug. l, 1999, at F-7 (reviewing GREEN, supra); Healing Old
Wounds, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 15, 1999, at Al4; PBS, Freedom Never Dies: The
Legacy of Harry T. Moore - Florida Terror - Who Killed Harry T. Moore, at http://www.
pbs.org/harryrnoore/terror/who.html (last visited July 30, 2003).
84. See Ray Jenkins, Alabama Slaying Laid to Klansmen; Former Member Testifies
Against Others Accused in Montgomery Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1976, at 13; Adam
Nossiter, Widow Inherits a Confession to a 36- Year-Old Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1993, at A5; Alabama Witness ofAlleged Slaying Admits an Error, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1976,
at 17; 3 Named as Klan Members Plead Not Guilty in Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1976, at
18; 3 Whites Indicted in '57 Black Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1976, at 38; see also John Ze
nor, Unresolved Death Casts Long Shadow: Despite a Deathbed Confession by One Suspect
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More forcefully, compare the June 29, 1958 bombing of the Bethel
Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama. Initially, Alabama prosecu
tors offered no indictments. Twenty years later in 1977, prosecutors
indicted white supremacist J. B. Stoner. Alabama state courts
extradited Stoner, convicted him, and sentenced him to ten years.85
Turn as well to the 1964 murder of civil rights workers Michael
Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James Chaney in Mississippi. The
June 21, 1964 abduction and shooting of the three men resulted in the
FBI arrest of twenty-one Klansmen. When local and state prosecutors
refused to act, federal prosecutors indicted nineteen of the Klansmen

on conspiracy charges. Despite three mistrials, Mississippi courts
convicted only seven Klansmen. Recently, the FBI opened 40,000
pages of investigative files on the murders, sparking calls for renewed
prosecution.86

Comparable calls mark the 1 965 murder of Oneal Moore, a thirty
four-year-old black Washington Parish Sheriff Deputy, in Varnado,

Louisiana. On June 2, 1965, Moore was shot and killed in a midnight
ambush while on patrol. Mississippi police arrested Klansman Ray
McElveen. Louisiana prosecutors extradited McElveen and indicted
him for murder but released him within weeks for insufficient
evidence and dropped all charges. The FBI reopened the case in the
1980s, posting a $40,000 reward on January 16, 2002.87

and the Cooperation of Another, an Alabama Man's Family is Waiting for Justice 42 Years
later, ATLANTA J.-CONST. , Mar. 4, 1999, at AJO; FBI Wants To Know If It Helped Klans
man Dodge Murder Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1993, at A13.

85. See Conviction in Bombing in Alabama ls Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1982, at 8;
Segregationist Gives Up To Serve Bombing Term, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1983, at A16; Segre
gationist Stoner ls Convicted in '58 Bombing and Gets JO Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1980, at
A20; U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Conviction of White Racist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1985, at
23.
86. See Ben Chaney, Schwerner, Chaney and Goodman: The Struggle for Justice, 27
HUM. RTS. Spring 2000 at 3; see also Kathleen Kenna, Racing Time: State that Once Shielded
the Klan ls Determined To Put It on Trial Before the Last Witnesses Die, TORONTO STAR,
Aug. 27, 2000, at Bl; Walter Rugaber, Mississippi Jury Convicts 7 of 18 in Rights Killings,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1 967, at 1; Emily Wagster, Next Old Civil Rights Case May Be 'Missis
sippi Burning' Murders, LETHBRIDGE HERALD, May 3, 2001, at Al3.
Consider also the July 14, 1964 murder of Henry Hezekiah Dee, a twenty-year-old saw
mill worker, and Charles Eddie Moore, a twenty-year-old college student, in Tallulah, Lou
isiana. Both Dee and Moore vanished on May 2, 1964, though neither was active in the civil
rights movement. A search party found their bodies in a nearby river. In November of 1964,
FBI and state officials arrested two Mississippi Klansmen, Charles M. Edwards and James
Ford Seale, on murder charges. State prosecutors dismissed the charges without convening a
grand jury. In 2002, Mississippi prosecutors and police officials, together with the FBI,
reopened the case for active investigation. See John Herbers, White Man Linked to Slain
Negroes: Alleged Klansman ls Said to Have Admitted Beating of 2 Men Found Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1966, at 1; Whites Freed in Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1965, at 18; 2 Whites
Seized in Negro Slayings: Mississippians Accused of Shooting 2 Hitchhikers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1964, at 56; see also Richard A. Serrano, Chasing Justice in the New South: A Brother
Who Won't Forget, a Prosecutor Who Won 't Give Up, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at Al.
,

87. See Alison Gerber, Prosecutors Reopening Other Decades-Old Cases of Murder,
USA TO DAY, May 1 8, 2000 at A3; Jerry Mitchell, Federal Trial in '66 Killing Likely,
,
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The same calls for reopening attend the . 1967 murder of Ben
Brown in Jackson, Mississippi. On May 1 1 , 1967, Brown was shot in
the back by police officers at a civil rights protest rally. Mississippi
officials conducted a week-long investigation but declined to make
arrests. In 1999, the Jackson Police Department established a Cold
Case Unit to investigate dormant investigations, as yet it has made no
arrests. Calls to reopen the investigation continue to sound even
though the two accused officers are dead.88
Turn more sharply to the 1966 murder of Ben Chester White, a
sixty-seven-year-old farmhand, in Natchez, Mississippi. On June 10,
1966, three Klansmen, Ernest Avants, Claude Fuller, and James Jones,
abducted White, shot him, and dumped his body in Pretty Creek at
Homochitto National Forest. Mississippi officials arrested all three
men. State court proceedings ended in a mistrial for Jones and an
acquittal for Avants. Fuller never stood trial. He and Jones

subsequently died. In 2000, federal prosecutors indicted Avants for
civil rights violations, citing federal j urisdiction over the Homochitto
National Forest.89
Last, turn to the 1970 murder of Rainey Pool, a one-armed share
cropper, in Louise, Mississippi. On April 1 1 , 1 970, seven white men
assaulted Pool outside of a Delta nightclub and dumped his body into
the Sunflower River where he died. Prosecutors obtained multiple
indictments in 1970 but declined to go forward. In 1998, at the urging
of Pool's family, prosecutors reopened the case and indicted five of
the seven surviving men on manslaughter charges: James "Doc"
Caston, his brother Charles E. Caston and half-brother Hal Spivey
Crimm, Dennis Newton, and Joe Oliver Watson. At three separate
trials, state courts acquitted Newton but convicted the Caston brothers

CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Jan. 9, 2002, at Al; Suzi Parker, In New South, a Bid to
Redress Old Crimes: Today's Prosecutors Raise the Priority of Unsolved Cases from the Civil
Rights Era, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 7, 2000, at l ; Paul Rioux, 1965 Murder of Dep
uty Gets New Look from FBI: Agents Launch 3rd Try to Solve Racial Killing, Ease Family's
Pain, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Louisiana), Aug. 17, 2001, at Al; Stephanie Saul, Their Killers
Walk Free: Because Murder Has No Statute of Limitations, and Political Strength of Black
Voters is Growing, Some Unsolved Killings of Black Men in the Civil Rights Era are Being
Revisited, B ALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 1998, at Cl; Richard A. Serrano, Chasing Justice in the New
South: Answers Elusive in 1965 Slaying, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al; Ed Timms, A New
Climate, a New Call for Justice, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 1990, at 22.

88.

See

Adam Lynch,

Cold Case Unit Reveals Tactics Involving 1967 Shooting,

MISS.

LINK, Feb. 15-21, 2001, at 2.

89.

See Rick

Bragg,

Last Cry for Justice in Mississippi as U.S. Trial Revisits '66 Killing,
A vants' Stroke May Derail Trial: Seventy
year-old Faces Federal Murder Charge in 1966 Case, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.),
Feb. 12, 2002, at Bl; Alleged Klansman is Freed in Slaying of Negro; Mississippi Had
Charged That Killing Was Attempt to Lure Dr. King in Murder Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1967, at 44; Klansmen Linked to Negro's Death; Co-Defendant Asserts Two Killed Mississip
pian, 65 N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1966, at 20; 3 Men Held in Mississippi on Charge of Killing
Negro, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1966, at 13.

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at 1; Jerry Mitchell,
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and Crimm, sentencing each to twenty years in prison. Watson
pleaded guilty.90
Albeit

truncated,

these

case

histories demonstrate

that

the

accepted conception of standard discretion permits prosecutors to
renew race cases in accord with the ethical and j urisprudential norms
of the criminal-justice system. Shorn from liberal legalism, those
norms grant both the independence of lawyers and the autonomy of
law. They also allow a departure from the colorblind stance of impar
tiality and neutrality toward race. In so doing, they give latitude to
color-coded pretext. Infused by racial-status distinctions and stereo
types, color-coded claims damage the prosecution function as a legal
process and, thereby, weaken both the professional and institutional
values of candor, openness, and fairness. Race-conscious discretion
revives that process, openly conceding the impact of race on lawyer
cognition, epistemology, and ideology, as well as its influence on

sociolegal roles, relationships, and institutions. The candid admission
of race as part of the criminal-justice process leaves race-conscious

discretion untied to restorative justice communities and redemptive
forms of advocacy. The next Part contemplates securing those ties in
the reopening of race cases under the standard ethical conception of
prosecutorial discretion.
III. STAN D AR D DISCRETION IN RACE CASES
The standard ethical conception for the prosecution of criminal
and civil rights cases rests on discretion. Prosecutorial discretion is
bound up in law, ethics, and tradition.91 The exercise of discretion
underlies prosecutorial decisions to commence, decline, and dismiss
actions in federal and state court. Decisions to abandon and to renew
race case prosecutions incite speculation about state racism and racial
hegemony.92 Such speculation provides ample explanation for prosecu-

90. See Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473, 479-82, 503 (Miss. 2002). Compare in this respect
the 1967 murder of Wharlest Jackson, a thirty-seven-year-old NAACP local chapter officer,
in Natchez, Mississippi. On February 27, 1 967, Jackson was killed by a truck bomb while
driving home. In spite of a 6,000 page investigative record, the FBI closed the case after the
statute of limitations on civil rights prosecutions expired. In 1998, the Natchez Board of
Alderman issued a resolution urging local police officials to reopen the case. A police review
of the FBI files ensued. See Seth S. King, Slaying Recalls Series of Deaths That Have Marked
Rights Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1%8, at 24; Anne Rochell Konigsmark, Civil Wrongs: Pres
sure Builds to Reopen the Unsolved Murders of Rights Activists in 1960s, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Feb. 21, 1999, at Ml.
91. See Richard Bloom, Prosecutorial Dlvcretion, 87 GEO. L.J. 1267 ( 1999); Teah R.
Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279 (2002); Robert L. Misner, Recasting
Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996); Roland G. Schroeder,
Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 GEO. L.J. 853 (1 990).
92. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State:
Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998-1999); Laura Kalman, From
Slavery to Freedom, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 6 1 (2001); Mark Tushnet, Constructing Paternalist He-
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torial failure and renewal. But the explanation may prove too much.
Its logic merges the prosecutor into the machinery of the state and
immerses professional ideals into racial ideology. That immersion
erases the independent-ethical role of the prosecutor and his autono
mous j udgment of legality and justice.
Independence aside, prosecutorial j udgment in race cases is never
far from bias. Entrenched in the political economy of the state and
circulating across culture and society, bias seeps into the criminal
j ustice system.93 Prosecutors interpose bias94 in the social construction
of crime.95 Distinct from the overtness of ·de jure discrimination, bias
emerges at all phases of criminal justice, extending from street-level
policing to courtroom sentencing.96 Pervasive in its reach, it intersects
·

gender and sexuality.97 Throughout these intersections, it combines
with the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of prosecutorial discretion, par
ticularly legality and justice. Validated by law and custom, bias sur
vives the remedial grassroots and legislative efforts of the twentieth
century civil rights movement.98

gemony: Gross, Johnson, and Hadden on Slaves and Masters, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 169
(2002); David Menschel, Note, A bolition Without Deliverance: The Law of Connecticut Slav
ery 1 784-1848, 111 YALE L.J. 183 (2001).

93. On the dynamics of bias, see Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding
S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001).
94. On prosecutor bias in the social construction of crime, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Ra
cial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739 (1993), and Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988).
See also w. LANCE BENNETI & MARTHA s. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981).
of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74

95. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT - RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1995); Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante's Inferno and the So
cial Construction of Crime, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 787 (2001 ); Paul Knepper, Race, Ra
cism and Crime Statistics, 24 S.U. L. REV. 71 {1996).
96. See Thorne Clark, Protection from Protection: Section 1983 and the ADA 's implica
tions for Devising a Race-Conscious Police Misconduct Statute, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1585
(2002); Kathryn Roe Eldridge, Racial Disparities in the Capital System: Invidious or Acci
dental, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2002); Marvin D. Free, Jr., Race and Presentencing Decisions in
the United States: A Summary and Critique of the Research, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 203 (2002).
97. See Serena Mayeri, "A Common Fate of Discrimination": Race-Gender A nalogies in
Legal and Historical Perspective, 1 10 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001 ); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111
YALE L.J. 769, 875-925 (2002).
98. See Jack M. Beerman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation: Fifty Years
Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981 (2002); Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of Afri
can American Fortunes-Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 369 (2002).
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Standard Discretion: Intrinsic Sources

Standard discretion defines the prosecution function as a means to
o
enf rce law and to promote j ustice.99 Fastening legality to j ustice
establishes the moral predicate for the criminal-justice system.

Moreover, it confirms the logic and legitimacy of that system.
Abraded by bias, the link between law and j ustice erodes in race cases.
The sometimes prejudicial interests clamoring for criminal j ustice cause-oriented groups, political parties, the media, and the public speed that erosion.
The history, organization, and adversary setting of criminal and
civil rights prosecutions direct prosecutorial decisionmaking in serving
the multiple interests of private parties and public agents.100 Critical
moments of decision come in investigating, charging, and plea
bargaining.1oi Efforts to guide such discretionary moments by
prudence, truth, or virtue102 struggle to overcome racial bias.1 03
Comparable efforts grounded in administrative, doctrinal, and ethical
regulation also falter.104

99. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 6ff7 (1999); Judith L. Maute, "In Pursuit ofJustice" in High Profile Criminal Maters, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1745 (2002); Fred. C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 YAND. L. REV. 45 (1991).
100. See Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L.
BULL. 126 (1988); David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of
Order, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 247 (1998); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an
Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 669 (1992); Alan Vinegrad, The Role ofthe Prosecutor:
Serving the Interests of All the People, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 895 (2000); Joan E. Jacoby, The
American Prosecutor in Historical Context, PROSECUTOR, May/June 1997, at 33.
101. See ABRAHAM s. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981); Eli Paul Mazur, Rational Expectations of Leni
ency: Implicit Plea Agreements and the Prosecutor's Role as a Minister ofJustice, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1333 (2002); Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the A utonomy of Prosecutorial
Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion - Knowing There Will Be
Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371 (2000) ; Lisa F. Salvatore, United
States v. Hammad: Encouraging Ethical Conduct of Prosecutors During Pre-Indictment In
vestigations, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 577 (1990).

102. See Darryl K. Brown, What Virtue Ethics Can Do for Criminal Justice: A Reply To
Huigens, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 29 (2002); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous
Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197 (1988); Bennett L. Gershman,
The Prosecutor's Duty to Trlllh, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309 {2001); Leslie C. Griffin, The
Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2001 ); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good
Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355 {2001).
103. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998); Tracey L. McCain, The Interplay of Editorial and Prosecu
torial Discretion in the Perpetuation of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 25 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 601 (1992).
104. See Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An A dministrative
Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473 (1976); Sheri Lynn John
son, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 475 (1998);
Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions,
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Ethical restraints on bias are thwarted by the enabling discretion of
law and community.105 Law divulges bias via custom and text. Custom
permits bias through habits and practices. Texts - constitutional,
statutory, and common law - authorize bias through their plain
meaning, legislative history, policy, and precedent. In race cases,
prosecutors apply constitutional and statutory texts in accord with the
racial customs of their office and locality.
Community instills bias by direct and indirect pressure. Direct
pressure follows from the prosecutorial-appointment process.
Appointed by election or merit selection, prosecutors periodically
must offer their policies and records up for popular or state ratifica
tion. That occasion serves as a kind of public referendum, a plebiscite
on the j uridical rules of race. Indirect pressure flows from cultural and
social conventions. Cultural conventions embodied in prosecutor
charging and jury deliberation decide on the suitability of black
victims for trial and the patience of black communities to endure
prosecutorial inaction and failure. Matching social conventions decree
the availability of white offenders for trial and the willingness of white
communities to accommodate the strife of trial without political inter
vention. For decades, law and community combined to stifle the

prosecution of race cases and to quiet outcry when that prosecution
fa iled.
For contemporary prosecutors, especially at the federal level,106
criminal and civil rights law and community fervor are no longer
freighted with the same weight of nineteenth-century bias. Less
encumbered by the racially inflammatory texts of law and the prejudi
cial onus of cultural and social convention, they enjoy expanded
discretion under augmented federal criminal laws107 and federal sen-

68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000) ; N. Douglas Wells, Prosecution as an Administrative Sys
tem: Some Fairness Concerns, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 841 (1999).
105. See Peter Krug, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National
Reports to the XV/th International Congress of Comparative Law: Section V Prosecutorial
Discretion and its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643 (2002); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint
of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981); James Vorenberg, Narrowing the
Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 4 DUKE L.J. 651 (1976).
106. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics,
55 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness ofFed
eral Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000) ; see also Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Conse
quences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming
Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2002); Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the
Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553

(1999).
107. See AMER. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW 32-35 (1998); Steven W. Qymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Crimi
nal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 675-97 (1997); Symposium, Federalization of Crime: The Role
of the Federal and State Governments in the Criminal Justice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 965
(1995).

1 170

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1141

tencing guidelines.108 The still developing body of procedural law
implementing

these

federal

criminal

statutes

seems

similarly

unhindered by brazenly asserted bias, though controversy afflicts the
burdens of procedure, specifically the judge-made evidentiary barriers
to selective prosecution claims.109 Paradoxically, by enlarging the
prosecutorial range of discretion in case selection, sentencing depar
tures, and penalty enhancement, these burgeoning statutes offer
greater opportunity for bias.1 10
Lacking the civil rights-era insulation afforded by state law
enforcement officials and the massive resistance of local white
communities, contemporary prosecutors seem more prone to hear
complaints of inaction and to suffer the inferences of bias-related
misconduct.1 1 1 The constitutional repercussions of misconduct charges
ignite debate over professional discipline and the abuse of ethical
rules. 1 12 Now, as before, charges of prosecutorial bias rarely address

the source of the bias itself.
Bias originates in community. The cohesion and vitality of
community hinge on values. Segregated community is founded on the
values of white superiority and domination. Rooted in segregated

108. See Cynthia K. Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal
Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
199 (1997); William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Fed
eral Sentencing Guidelines: ls the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 373
(1995); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1471 (1993).
109. See Marc Michael, Note, United States v. Armstrong: Selective Prosecution - A
Futile Defense and Its Arduous Standard of Discovery, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (1998);
Tobin Romero, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfilling the Promise of
Equal Justice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043 (1996).
1 10. See G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised Constitu·
tional Theory or New Congressional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive
Discretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1 175 (1995); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution
and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prose
c111orial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325-44 (1 997); Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A.
Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137 (1 995).
1 1 1 . John M. Burkoff, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty Not " To Strike Foul Blows", 53 U.
PITT. L. REV. 271, 282 (1992); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury In
vestigations, 51 S.C. L. REV. 1 , 10-20 (1999); see Andrew M. Hertherington, Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 90 GEO. L.J. 1679 (2002).
1 1 2. See Jennifer Blair, Comment, The Regulation of Federal Prosecutorial Misconduct
by State Bar Associations: 28 U.S.C. § 530B and the Reality of Inaction, 49 UCLA L. REV.
625 (2001); Frank 0. Bowman, III, A Bludgeon by Any Other Name: The Misuse of " Ethical
Rules" Against Prosecutors to Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665,
687-90 (1996); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1999); Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and
Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 7 1 TEMP. L. REV. 887 (1998);
Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001);
see also Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment,
1 13 HARV. L. REV. 2080 (2000).
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community, both northern and southern prosecutors fell subject to
white racial ideology. Nothing in the prosecutorial office granted
immunity from its malevolence. But lack of immunity alone scarcely
explains prosecutorial inaction and failure in the instant race cases.
Fuller explanation of prosecutorial breakdown points to the discre
tionary calculus of instrumental lawyering.
Instrumental theories animate the prosecution and defense func
tions. Value-laden in design, instrumental lawyering is purposive. The
purposes encompass broad and narrow goals. Result-oriented in style,
such lawyering seeks certain outcomes. The outcomes arise in single
cases or along a continuum of cases. This consequentialist ethic
extends to case selection and trial strategy.
The freedom to exert autonomy in case selection and strategy
distinguishes prosecutors from other state agents. To borrow from
William Simon's prior writing on ethical discretion elsewhere in
lawyering, the freedom to pursue "potentially enforceable legal
claims" and "to refuse to assist in the pursuit of legally permissible
courses of action" puts prosecutors at some distance from the state. 1 13
Distance of this sort is significant. It implies discretion and political
room to maneuver. Variation in the degree of distance from state
authority delimits the ambit of discretion available to prosecutors.
However narrow, that ambit reserves the inchoate redemptive oppor
tunity to advance legality and j ustice in the prosecution of race cases.
The prospect for redemptive prosecution in race cases rises from
reflection. Prosecutorial discretion carries what Simon calls "a profes
sional duty of reflective j udgment."114 Reflection involves an assess
ment of the relative merits of the state's criminal-justice goals and
claims. For the cases assembled here, the goals include conciliation,
integration, and segregation. The claims sound colorblind, color
coded, or color-conscious themes.
Both state goals and claims entail conflicting considerations of
criminal justice. The considerations favor different groups and out
comes. Conciliation goals encourage face-to-face meeting and forgive
ness. Integration goals promote gradual cooperation and mercy.
Segregation goals foster separation and reprisal. Tilted toward integra
tion, colorblind claims grope to obtain incremental changes in inter
group relations. Covertly joined with racial partition, color-coded
claims work to preserve unequal relations. Openly revisionist, color
conscious claims alternately serve to realign and retrench intergroup
positions.
Prosecutorial reconciliation of the competing merits of criminal
j ustice goals and claims requires a sense of legality and j ustice

1 13. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1083 (1988).
1 1 4. Id.
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independent of state sanction. Professional independence from the
client, the market, and the state comports with Simon's sense of the
"traditional ambitions of lawyers."115 For Simon, realizing that ambi
tion demands direct-lawyer participation in relevant decisionmaking,
not unreflective acquiescence to the commands of vigilante mobs or
partisan officials. Such participation, uninhibited by offender
bargaining, victim preference, or state prerogative, involves a prosecu
tor-initiated process of elaborating and implementing norms of
legality and justice. To be helpful, elaboration must go outside the tra
ditional law of race and the entailment of de j ure and de facto
discrimination. Deploying countervailing constitutional, statutory, and
common law resources, it must aspire to restore community and to
reconcile conflict. In the same way, implementation must go beyond
customary-legal remedy to fashion equitable, community-based relief.
The starting point for the vindication of the norms of legal merit
and j ustice in race cases is the particularized circumstance of the
victim, the offender, and their cohort communities. Promoting j ustice
in these difficult circumstances urges the embrace of the discretionary
norms applied in j udicial decisionmaking. The analogy to j udicial
decisionmaking in lawyering is not uncommon. 1 16 B uilding on this
analogy, Simon recommends j udge-made norms for their analytic
breadth, flexibility, and complexity.117
Unlike the instrumentalist emphasis on lawyering goals and claims,
the formalist style of judicial decisionmaking stresses relative and

internal merit. Applied to the prosecution of race cases, relative merit
comprises three measures: law, interest, and equality. The first tests

the legal underpinnings of prosecutorial goals and claims against
governing constitutional, statutory, and common law standards in
search of accord and, when unavailing, reform. The second appraises
the quality of the public and private interests embedded in prosecuto
rial goals and claims, a measure that admittedly may prove unquan
tifiable. The third estimates the remedial impact of asserted prosecu
torial goals and claims on political and social inequality. Simon refers
to this impact as a kind of equalization effect, more pertinent to legal
services access than political or socioeconomic status.1 18 Conceptually,
it bears noting that equalization possesses enough dexterity to address
both racial access to j ustice in law and racial equality in society.
Unquestionably, Simon's proposed measures of relative merit pose
difficulties. Law is far too indeterminate and its policies too often

1 15. Id. at 1 144.
1 16. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993).
1 17.

See Simon, supra note 1 13, at

118. Id. at 1093.

1090-91.
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incommensurate to resolve merit by force of will. Even edicts carrying
the force of law may still not cure ancient nonconformity, as shown in

the repeated frustration of Reconstruction and post-Brown era statu
tory and constitutional decrees. Interest analysis is also suspect. Public
and private interests frequently stand incompatible. State, offender,
and victim interests similarly diverge. Remedial solutions enamored
of equality also generate uncertainty. Equality remedies spawn
incalculable effects, sometimes recasting the very form and substance
of discrimination, for example in the criminal context of j ury selection
where tolerance for race-based peremptory challenges continues to
survive j udicial scrutiny.119 Such secondary and often unforeseeable
effects may contravene the purpose of the remedy itself.
Faced with compound indeterminacies in assaying the relative
merit of state criminal-justice goals and claims, prosecutors must turn
to an inspection of internal merit in race cases. To Simon, internal
merit dictates an assessment of legal value. This valuation consists of
three parts.120 The first part evaluates the substance and procedure of
the appointed goals and claims. The substantive and procedural goals
of race cases relate to the formal protection and vindication of
communities of color under criminal and civil rights statutes. The
second part assesses the purpose and form of state goals and claims.
The redemptive purposes of race cases fracture upon entering the
criminal-justice system where adversarial and penal conventions
thwart restorative-justice goals. The third part contemplates the
framing of state goals and claims in broad and narrow terms. The
framing of race cases adverts broadly to black and white community,
but refers narrowly to the offender and victim.
Prosecutor appraisal of the relative and internal merit of state

criminal-justice goals and claims in race cases gathers consequence
when state decisionmakers in law enforcement locales, legislatures,
and courts abdicate responsibility for guaranteeing equal protection
and due process rights to communities of color. In these circum
stances, as here, state decisionmakers fall unreliable. Doubtless the
logic of collective action, coupled with federalism and separation of
powers principles, urges fairly apportioning responsibility to multiple
state decisionmakers in race cases. Evidence of institutional bias,
however, behooves prosecutors to lead the decisionmaking process in
establishing and implementing controverted state goals in race cases.
Prosecutorial leadership in race cases requires a role-situated
brand of self-appraisal tailored to the exercise of discretion. To be
useful, lawyer self-appraisal must set out a manageable and reliable
decisionmaking procedure. Indicated by Simon, self-appraisal gives

1 1 9. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
120. Simon, supra note 1 13, at 1096-109.
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rise to a heightened duty to assure a sound procedure for the formula
tion of state criminal-j ustice goals and claims. Soundness implies effi
cacy in intervention. Embellishing Simon, this process imperative
reinforces the prosecutor's ordinary duty to take "reasonably available
actions to make the procedure as effective as possible and to forgo
actions that would reduce its efficacy."121 Implying an efficacy princi
ple militates against prosecutor dissonance and deception in pursuing
state goals.
The interventionist duty to formulate a decision procedure
demands close attention to the purpose and form of prosecution.
Mainstream purposes well-matched to community wants channel
prosecutors to abide by formal procedure. Reformist purposes,
discordant with community desires, leave prosecutors unguided by
traditional procedure. The burden of unguided discretion accentuates
the complex procedural j udgments and responsibilities prosecutors
undertake in assuring substantively valid decisions in race cases.
Prosecutorial j udgments of purpose and form may be aided by
reframing state criminal-j ustice goals and claims. Reframing entails
the deployment of broad and narrow issue templates. Narrow

templates, Simon explains, define issues "in terms of a small number
of characteristics of the parties and their dispute," for example, in a
white-on-black crime of assault or murder.122 Broad templates define
issues "to encompass the parties' identities, relationship, and social
circumstances[,)" for example, in a race-infected hate crime offense.123
For utility, the templates must correspond to the facts and issues in
controversy. Simon posits certain general standards of relevance to
guide the process of framing.124
Of these standards, the first is interpretive plausibility. Plausibility
in the interpretation of law and fact in race cases is battered by lasting
antebellum legal privilege and evidentiary presumption. White
privilege, with its deep-seated bias, may mislead law. At the same
time, presumptive white credibility may undermine fact.
The second standard of relevance is practical impact. The salutary
impact of reopening race cases on criminal and civil rights law,
community, and inequality is unsure. If the cases flourish, legislatures
may curtail the scope of applicable law. Judges may also ration its use.
Even communities may resent its imposition. Meanwhile, inequality
may prosper with its political and economic undercarriage intact.
The third standard of relevance is knowledge. Prosecutor knowl
edge of the issues in race cases is ostensibly confined to the sphere of

121. Id. at 1 100.
122. Id. at 1107.
123. lei. at 1 107-08.
124. Id.
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criminal j ustice. Although triggered by crime, race cases develop out
of conditions of political powerlessness and socioeconomic inequality.
At bottom, the cases deal with discrimination shrouded in violence.
Outside of the criminal-justice system, prosecutors' knowledge of
discrimination and its repercussions for communities of color is often
meager.125
The fourth standard of relevance is institutional competence.
Prosecutors in race cases possess the competence to investigate and
indict white lawbreakers. Bolstered by courts, they join in the conduct
of trials and negotiation of sentences. But their powers of penalty
assignment and remedial monitoring are secondary to law enforce
ment officials and managerial judges. Ill-equipped for relief-giving
duties, prosecutors flounder outside their ken.
Reframing state criminal-j ustice goals and claims in accordance

with general standards of relevance is likely to narrow prosecutorial
j udgments of purpose and form in race cases. For prosecutors, inter
pretive plausibility may prove too attenuated and practical impact too
paltry. Absent sufficient knowledge and institutional competence to
mobilize a broader political-legal reform strategy, they may submit
their j udgments to the prosecution of discrete, disaggregated cases. In
this surprising way, Simon's proffered bundle of standards help frame
the relevant purpose and form of prosecutions in race cases.
The intrinsic sources of legality and j ustice entwined in the
calibrations of relative and internal merit lay down the normative
fo undation for prosecutorial discretion. That foundation is buttressed
by the values of autonomy and good faith in decisionmaking. Race
cases confront prosecutors with conflicting state and community
commitments to legality and justice. The collision of prosecutor, state,
and community norms calls for autonomy.
Prosecutorial autonomy takes two forms: conciliation and inde
pendence. Conciliation drives the prosecutor to find grounds for
community agreement over racially revisionist state criminal-j ustice
goals and claims. The agreement may come from republican dialogue
and deliberation or from a shared vision of the common good. As the
instant cases show, racial animus may prevent such agreement. It may
hamper dialogue and disrupt deliberation. And it may preclude
consensus over the selection and implementation of state ends.
Independence prods the prosecutor to overcome racial discontinu
ity in state commitments to legality and j ustice by returning to the
legal values of internal merit. These values underscore the importance

of independent community-oriented goal and claim selection. To an

1 25. The community prosecution movement signals the gradual rectification of the ex
tra-judicial neglect of race. See Jana Sorensen, Slums: A Dirty Shame, PROSECUTOR,
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 34; Rita Spillane, Community Prosecutors as Pioneers, PROSECUTOR,
Nov./Dec. 2002, at 34.
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extent, that professional conviction is weakened by the prosecutor's
own counterposing pledge to effect state-certified values and out
comes, however bigoted and inequitable. Ascertaining community
goals in race cases without the coincidence of prosecutor-state norma
tive commitments requires reasoned and inclusive deliberation with
both black and white communities.
Community deliberation over the place of color in the prosecution
of race cases makes no promise of consensus. In fact, to engage in such
extra-state deliberation, prosecutors must adopt a denaturalized view
of consensus that concedes the normal suppression of minority voices.

Problematizing the notion of consensus in this way uncloaks prosecu
tor tendencies towards coercion and exclusion. Exposing coercion and
acknowledging exclusion in the traditional model of discretionary
decisionmaking makes little progress toward prosecutor-community
goal consensus or coincidence. But finding coherence and compatibil
ity may be futile. Condemned to futility, prosecutors must neverthe
less seek at least some sense of community confirmation or assent.
The risk in seeking out such express or implied consent lies in prosecu
torial overreaching.126 Deprived of intrinsic sources to curb over
reaching and its unfettered discretion, prosecutors must rely on
extrinsic sources of authority to guide their discretion.127
B.

Standard Discretion: Extrinsic Sources

Extrinsic sources of discretion restrain and embolden the reprose
cution of race cases. These sources derive from ethics rules, constitu
tional values, and community norms. Collectively, they shape the
prosecution function alternately into an instrument of racial emanci
pation and subordination. That instrumental function is exemplified
by the charging decision. The contested site of conscious and uncon
scious racism, charging constitutes an act of naming. The naming of a
white offender and a black victim in race cases signifies prosecutorial
freedom from the antebellum state and Jim Crow culture and society.
The main source of extrinsic discretion comes from governing
ethics rules arid standards. Promulgated by federal and state bar asso
ciations, 128 national advisory groups,129 and governmental agencies,130

126. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001).
127. For a more sympathetic account of intrinsic sources, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Im·
poverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2620-36 (1993) [hereinafter Alfieri, Impoverished
Practices).
128. See AMER. BAR ASS'N MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1983); AMER.
BAR ASS'N MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2001); AMER. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1993).
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and ratified by court enforcement, the rules and standards regulate
prosecutorial power in charging, investigation, plea bargaining, trial
practice, and sentencing.131 Regulation retreats from larger issues of
adversary justice and institutional incentive.132 It prefers instead to
address matters of conflict, impropriety, and discipline. 133 Discussion
of these interstitial matters normally omits mention of racial identity
and a racialized narrative. Even in the context of race cases, discussion
routinely holds tightly to the position of neutrality. Tied to an adver
sarial ethic, that position espouses the norms of partisanship and
moral nonaccountability.
Although stripped of moral accountability and express racial
purpose, bar rules early established the prosecutorial duty to see that
justice is done. Initially proclaimed under the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, that public duty
condemns fact suppression and witness tampering.134 The ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct reiterate the prosecutorial responsibil
ity to serve as a minister of justice.135 Likewise, the ABA Standards for

Criminal Justice reaffirm the prosecutorial obligation to seek j ustice
rather than merely convict.136 The Standards assign the prosecutor the

129. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 97, 99,
109, 112, 123 (2000); NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS (2d ed. 1991).
130. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-27.000 to .745
(1997) (enumerating principles of federal prosecution).
131. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors:
The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291
(1992); Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923 (1996); Donald G. Gif
ford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983
U. ILL. L. REV. 37; Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due Process and the Death Penalty: The
Role of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials, 23 LA w & HUM.
BEHAV. 471 (1999).
132 See H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF
CRIME IN AMERICA (1996); Kenneth Bresler, "/ Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep
Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1996); Catherine Ferguson
Gilbert, It ls Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: ls the Win-Loss
Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283 (2001);
Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and
Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995).
133. See Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor
Conflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 468-83 (1993); Roberta K. Flowers, What
You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors,
63 MO. L. REV. 699 {1998); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many
Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995); Fred C.
Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors or, Who Should Regu
late the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1996).
134.

See AMER.

BAR ASS'N CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908).

135.

See AMER.

BAR ASS'N MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt (2003).

136.
(1993).

See

AMER. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-l.2(c)
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critical, quasi-judicial role of j ustice administrator. Entrusting him to
pursue the interests of j ustice with broad discretionary powers, the
Standards urge the prosecutor to elevate the quality of criminal jus
tice.137
The elevation of criminal j ustice to a higher standard of public
ministration comports with the specific mandates of prevailing ethics
rules.138 These rules issue four chief mandates: evidentiary burdens,
the rights of the accused, the defender lawyer-client relationship, and
trial-associated publicity. To discharge his evidentiary burdens, the
prosecutor must marshal probable cause in support of the charging
decision and make timely disclosure of evidence relevant to guilt and
sentencing. To safeguard the accused, he must honor the right to
obtain counsel and strive to prevent the unknowing waiver of pretrial
rights. To preserve the defender lawyer-client relationship and the
integrity of the adversary system, he must reign in the intrusions of
lawyer-targeted subpoena power. To avert the prej udicial impact of
pretrial and trial publicity, he must limit the extra-judicial statements
of subordinates and refrain from illegitimate extra-j udicial comments
likely to arouse public condemnation of the accused.139
Conferring the role of justice minister, these rule-issued mandates
recognize the influence wielded by prosecutors in race cases. Bestowed
as an institutional prerogative, that influence extends to charging,

discovery, pretrial motions, trial practice, and sentencing. Each compo
nent of practice corresponds to a differential form of discretion. And

each risks the repetition of an essentializing construction of race in the

cloak of victim and community inferiority. Cloaking victims and com

munities of color in antebellum stigma is an act of normative privileging.
That act forsakes the victim. Equally important, it severs the redemptive

obligations of the offender.
Shielding the victim from denigrating stigma and sparing the
offender from undeserved retaliation in race cases prod prosecutors to
draw upon a second extrinsic source of authority, bound up in the
constitutional values of due process and equal protection.140 Exalted in

137. See id. at Standard 3-l.2(d) cmt.
138. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Coe/es: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 ( 1993).
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a)-(f) cmt; see also AMER. BAR
ASS'N MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A)-(B) (1982); Scott M. Mathe
son, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865 (1990).
140. See Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the
Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279 (2001); Michael T.
Fisher, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process: There's More to Due
Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298 (1988); Donald G. Gifford, Equal
Protection and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 659 (198 1 ); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth
Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 923 (2000).
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the moral structure of the Constitution, these procedural and egali
tarian norms unleash, and provide a bulwark against, prosecutorial
incursions under the banner of state-law enforcement. The thrust of
state criminal enforcement actions, however, oftentimes overwhelms
procedural fortifications. Indeed, when carelessly planned, the incur
sions quickly threaten to trample the dignitary interests of the victim
and the equality interests of the offender. Dignitary interests concern
self-worth and social value. Equality interests pertain to evenhanded
treatment. For black victims, dignity is endangered by wounding
treatment of the black body caused by prosecutor, jury, and public
denigration.141 For white offenders, equality is imperiled by double
jeopardy142 and speedy trial infractions.143
Constitutional norms of dignity and equality are realized during the
investigation and trial of race cases. The investigation of racially moti
vated violence summons the managerial role of the prosecutor in
supervising local law enforcement. That institutional role requires the
fair-minded supervision of law enforcement officials in targeting, appre
hending, and interrogating suspects.
The trial of racial violence calls upon the educational role of the
prosecutor in teaching the offender, jury, and community about the
experience of violence and its manifold harm. Teaching harm to a
segregated community inhabited by the offender and victim demands the

abnegation of natural and scientific claims of racial inferiority.144 It also
compels the disavowal of the virtues of separatism.

141. See }ODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 81-114 (1997); Kevin Brown, The Social
Construction of a Rape Victim: Stories ofAfrican-American Males A bout the Rape of Desiree
Washington, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 9'17; Ariela Gross, Pandora's Box: Slave Character on
Trial in the Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 267 (1995); Lawrence Vogel
man, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial and the Use of Racial Stereo
types in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (1993).

142. For useful discussions of double jeopardy in successive state-federal prosecutions,
see Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King,
and the A CL U, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609 (1994), and Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars:
The Case for a Civil Rights "Exception," 41 UCLA L. REV. 649 (1994). See also Kenneth
Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an
Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887 (1998).
143. Speedy trial safeguards emanate from both constitutional and statutory sources,
including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Sixth
Amendment, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, VI, & XIV; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b)
& 50(b). On speedy trial principles, see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword, Sixth Amendment
First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 649-77 (1996), and George C. Thomas, III, When Constifll
tional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100
MICH. L. REV. 145, 228-31 {2001). See also Peter Applebome, Mississippi Hearing in Evers
Slaying Pits Trial Rights against Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at A 1 8.
144. See Frank Dikotter, Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics,
103 AM. H IST. REV. 467 {1998).
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Teachings of moral import point to a third extrinsic source of discre
tion in the guise of community. In race cases, the cardinal values of the
criminal-justice system - retribution and redemption - stem from
community norms. Stirred by vengeance, retribution entails punishment.
Inspired by mercy, redemption entails penitence and forgiveness. Both
victim-centered vengeance and offender-centered redemption reflect the
character and custom of a community. Race-tom communities are likely
to be the custodians of antebellum character and segregated custom.
Their custodial stake in violence is inimical to the prosecutorial
commitment to interracial justice. That stake may be unyielding. It may
rebuff appeals to criminal justice, public welfare, and constitutional
value. It may refuse to treat violence as a collective injury. And it may
reject the role of prosecutor as the trustee of the common good.145
Founded on social contract theory, the prosecutor-trustee role
requires institutional deference by offender and victim alike. It also
necessitates interracial reciprocity by offender and victim support groups
and their communities. Deference highlights the intrinsic sources of
prosecutorial discretion. It leaves the judgments of legality and justice to
the prosecutor. Reciprocity underscores the extrinsic sources of prosecu
torial discretion. It hinges on the outside judgments of ethical
concurrence, constitutional valuation, and community conviction.146
Together, deference and reciprocity transform the prosecutorial
role. That transformation invigorates the redemptive aspect of the
prosecutorial function. Employed as state agents of redemption,
prosecutors stand free to enunciate the norms of penitence, forgive

ness, and mercy. However alluring, their newfound theology of heal
ing founders in race cases. Although deduced from intrinsic and ex
trinsic sources of prosecutorial discretion, it fails to install a racial
compass to guide discretion in the use of colorblind, color-coded, and
color-conscious modes of analysis. The next Part elucidates the
distinctions of color consciousness in prosecutorial discretion.
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS DISCRETION
The notion of race-conscious discretion offers an alternative justi
fication for the resurgent prosecution of white-on-black racial
violence. Extracted from the normative foundation established by

standard discretion, the notion of race-conscious prosecutorial discre
tion holds a shared commitment to legality and justice. It bolsters that
commitment by like reference to ethics, constitutional values, and
community norms. Despite these common intrinsic and extrinsic

145. See Elisa E. Ugarte,
L. REV. 269, 274-78 (1999).

The Government Lawyer and the Common Good,

146. For an earlier account of prosecutor roles, see Alfieri,
1, at 831-49.

lence/Reconstructing Community, supra note

40 S. TEX.
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origins, standard and race-conscious forms of discretion differ. The
crux of the difference lies in adversarial faith.
Standard discretion posits a misplaced faith in the adversary sys
tem. Modernist rather than absolutist in tone, that faith concedes inci
dental and systemic error. Incidental errors are performative. They
point to deficiencies in the performance of law enforcement, advocacy,
and adjudication functions. The deficiencies are treated as isolated
and ephemeral. Even when obdurate, they are deemed susceptible to

individual correction. In contrast, systemic errors disclose deficiencies
in the basic structure of law enforcement, advocacy, and adjudication.
The deficiencies are recurrent and intractable. Impervious to change,
they withstand individual and institutional remedy.
The acknowledgement of incidental and systemic error within the
adversary system of criminal j ustice overlooks the virulence of race.
This oversight is endemic to the standard conception. To overlook
race is not to deny it. Prosecutors guided by standard discretion admit
to race in the profiling of offenders, in the selection of j urors and j ury
pools, and in shopping for judges. They also admit to race in the narra

tive texts of their opening statements, closing arguments, and pretrial
comments. Yet, these admissions are blind to color in its full norma
tive and social meaning.
The institutional faith of standard discretion emanates from
suppression. Standard discretion suppresses the normative conse
quence of coloring identity and narrative, and the social significance of
coloring advocacy. Part of the explanation for this suppression
pertains to the individualistic content of the criminal law and the
adversary system. The criminal law principally contemplates solitary
wrongdoing. The adversary system primarily addresses individual law
breakers. Neither focuses on community transgression and collective
responsibility for lawbreaking.147
Additionally, part of the explanation for the suppression of color
relates to the neutral pretense of the ethical canons of the legal profes
sion. The pretense of neutrality is inextricably linked to partisanship
and moral nonaccountability. Partisanship veils colored discourse in
the ethos of adversarialism. Moral nonaccountability excuses it inside
and outside the domain of law. Repeated evidence of this pretense is
discoverable in the norms and meanings of racial discourse in the
criminal-j ustice system. Routinely heard among prosecutors, and
echoed among lawyer defenders, judges, and law enforcement agents,
that discourse approves distinct modes of colorblind, color-coded, and
color-conscious representation. However biased in content and

147. On collective guilt and responsibility for community transgression, see Sanford
Cloud Jr., The Next Bold Step Toward Racial Healing and Reconciliation: Dealing with the
Legacy of Slavery, 45 How. L.J. 157 (2001), and George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures:
Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 1 1 1 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002).
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discriminatory in effect, none· of these narrative modes apparently
departs from neutrality. Evidently, they are merely partisan. At worst,
they are overzealous. More important, none of the modes is presumed
to be adverse to identity or inimical to community.
Rhetorical approval or disapproval of the trope of color signals
competing public commitments to racial identity and status in law and
society. Historical crimes of white-on-black racial violence give prose
cutors the opportunity to realize their commitments to color in the
ongoing decisions of criminal advocacy. The vectors of punishment
and mercy form a basic dyad of commitment for the prosecutor in his

public role of crime-fighting sentinel and criminal-justice minister.
Fulfilling that dual role in a redemptive spirit of conciliation may

prove beneficial to the struggle for interracial community justice. But

it may invite the popular condemnation of victim and offender groups.
No offender or victim - white or black - stands alone apart from
his identity-based community. Materially, each comes from situated
family and community circumstances. Symbolically, each reflects the
character of that original community, either in a discrete feature or in
a multiplicity of traits. At all times, each offender and victim belongs
to a specific group or a collection of community groups. Ordinarily
consigned to colorblind or color-coded adversarial conflict, those
groups may collide differently in a move to race-conscious, redemptive
prosecution.
Faced with white-on-black violence, black-victim groups may look
to race-conscious, redemptive prosecutions on egalitarian grounds,
demanding equal punishment for white lawbreakers. White offender
groups may view the same prosecutions on procedural grounds,
insisting on the protection of due process safeguards for lawbreakers.
The clash of state-sponsored restorative conciliation, victim-implored
instrumental vengeance, and unrepentant offender-pleaded proce
dural formalism is the paradox of racially redemptive prosecution in
the adversary context of retributive punishment. That clash indicates
that race-conscious, redemptive bids for interracial reconciliation may
be incompatible with the reprisal norms of adversarial j ustice. It also
suggests that such bids may be incongruent with community senti
ment, insofar as community may be said to exist in a racially polarized

state.
The liberal imagination, beset by a plural tolerance for divided
community, offers little chance of resolving this central paradox of
race-conscious, redemptive prosecution. Closely tied to the rational
individualism of adversarial contest, liberalism holds limited tools
from which to build a legal process of racial conciliation. Individualism
strains to engage in the dialogue and other-directed empathy required
for reconciliation. Tolerance prefers the passivity of secular forbear
ance to the affirmative, identity-imbued clasp of reconciliation.

March 2003]

Retrying Race

1183

Pluralism endorses a weak sense of community best defined by com
petition rather than cooperative consensus.
The atomized fellowship, meek tolerance, and thin consensus of
liberal community are further undermined by critical race j urispru
dence. Critical race theorists castigate liberal tolerance for its
repression of diversity. They also rebuke liberal consensus for manu
facturing a false civic accord. Solicitous of intersectional color and its
promise of common fellowship, they call for a more inclusive tolerance
and a more genuine consensus across racial lines traditionally dividing

African-American, Latino/a, Asian, and Native-American communi
ties.
Race-conscious, redemptive discretion joins liberal and critical
race j urisprudence in reconstructing the adversarial model of prosecu
tion. Both liberal and critical race scholars point to pervasive evidence
of race discrimination in law and society.148 In the criminal-justice

setting, scholars observe patterns of disparity binding race, crime, and
criminal justice.149 The patterns surface in prosecutorial charging150 and
court sentencing.151 Their repercussions materialize in accusations of
selective prosecution152 and in damage to black communities.153

148. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001);' CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE A QUESTION OF COLOR (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Burdens and Bene
fits of Race in America, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219 (1998).
-

149. See BENJAMIN BOWLING & CORETTA PHILLIPS, RACISM, CRIME AND JUSTICE
(2002); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); SAMUEL WALKER ET
AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2000) ;
RACE, ETHNICITY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, VIOLENT CRIME: THE REALITIES AND THE
MYTHS (Nathaniel J. Pallone ed., 2000) ; Richard R. W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City:
Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1219 (2000); Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System,
94 MICH. L. REV. 1660 (1 996); Anna Wang, Beyond Black and White: Crime and Foreign
ness in the News, 8 ASIAN L.J. 187 (2001).
150. See Amy Grossman Applegate, Prosecutorial Discretion and Discrimination in the
Decision to Charge, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 35 (1982); Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discre
tion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 437 (1984); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial
Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 587 (1985); Cassia Spohn et al., The
Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Fel
ony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1987).
151. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION (1989);
Kathryn Roe Eldridge, Racial Disparities in the Capital System: Invidious or Accidental?, 14
CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2002); Larry Michael Fehr, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Prosecution
and Sentencing: Empirical Research of the Washington State Minority and Justice Commis
sion, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 577 (1996-97); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Dis
parities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285 (2001);
Charles Ogletree, The Significance of Race in Federal Sentencing, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP.

229 (1994).
152. See Paul Butler, Starr is to Clinton as Regular Prosecutors A re to Blacks, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 705 (1999); P.S. Kane, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of Prosecutorial Dis
cretion for Selective Prosecution, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2293 (1993); Romero, supra note 109.
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Scholarship documenting these repercussions and searching out
remedies demonstrates that race consciousness, and the offshoots of
affirmative action and multiculturalism, are not the sole preserve of
critical race scholars.154 Stitched in race-neutral color, they are already
embroidered in the liberal text of ethics rules governing the adversary
system.
To their credit, ethics rules prohibit bias in prosecutor charging,
discovery, pretrial jury selection, trial practice, and more. Guided by
adversarial norms, the rules emphasize procedural j ustice and eviden
tiary fairness. The ABA Standards, for example, bar intentional
misrepresentation, bad faith, knowing offers of false or inadmissible
evidence, and misstatements of evidence. As previously mentioned,
they also regulate extra-judicial public statements calculated to cause
prejudice. More profoundly, they ban invidious racial discrimination
in mounting an investigation or prosecution.155
The ban on invidious discrimination enmeshes prosecutors in
debate beyond the choice of allocating intrinsic and extrinsic sources

of discretion. Without diminishing the importance of that debate to
prosecutorial decisions at indictment or at voir dire, sorting out the
right balance of discretionary sources is unlikely to resolve the
parameters of a race-conscious duty in cases of white-on-black racial
violence. Compelled by the facts of violence but pinioned between the
ideals of colorblind constitutionalism and the practical efficacy of
color-coded stereotypes, prosecutors may be tempted to opt for covert
resolution . . Put simply, they may resort to a clandestine style of race
conscious decisionmaking behind a veneer of race-neutral rhetoric, a
style evident only in its de facto consequences.
Clothed in the adversarial tradition, this pretextual style of race
neutral prosecution actually may serve the key interests of victims and
communities of color in race cases. Refashioning antebellum and
postbellum codes of color into retributive claims, it might deliver indi
vidualized j ustice to black victims and kindle the collective healing of
black communities. Concurrently, it might exact j ustice from white
offenders and thereby invite the partial redemption of white commu-

153. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Dam
age of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005 (2001).
154. Compare Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial
Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864 (1990), and Ilhyung
Lee, Race Consciousness and Minority Scholars, 33 CONN. L. REV. 535 {2001), with Samuel
Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669 (1998), and Nancy
S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659 (2002), and Reginald
Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness Matrix and the Multiracial Category
Movement, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (2000) , and Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures:
An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2001).
155.
(1993).

See

AMER. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.1, 3-5.8
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nities. In such ways, it might mediate the prosecutorial tension of
competing commitments to privately incurred punishment and

publicly displayed j ustice. Finally, it might fulfill the obligation of
liberal community to tolerate a continuing partition among still
divided and often implacable racial groups.
On any yardstick, these are substantial accomplishments. What
ever the pretext, to meet even partially the interests of victim and
offender communities and to carry out the purposes of private and
public j ustice are formidable achievements. They gain added luster by
satisfying the goals of liberalism and the imperatives of legality.
Although not enhanced by the pretense of race-neutrality, surely the
value of legality is not lessened by its presence. Similarly, the value of
liberalism is not diluted by the inauthenticity of racial pretense, par
ticularly when, as here, it fosters consequentialist goals. What may be
diminished are the value of open procedure and the virtue of j uridical

candor. Redemption depends in substantial measure on the values of
process and candor.
Race-conscious discretion borrows impoverished norms of process
and candor from the standard conception of discretion. Importing
these norms replicates the complications of private retribution and
public redemption that irk the standard conception. Even with the
embellishments of legality and justice, those complications may be
insoluble. Race-conscious discretion merely extends the tenets of
liberal legalism; it does not cure or displace them. Sympathetically
extended, standard discretion may be pressed into closer alliance with
the goals of interracial community and citizenship. That alliance
requires the recognition of racial status and the elevation of process
and candor in prosecuting race cases.
Inscribed in sociolegal identity and narrative, racial status is
obscured in the colorblind and color-coded prosecution of race cases.
Colorblind prosecution avoids the inscription of status out of formalist
conviction. Avoidance shuns status distinctions as irrelevant to the
advocacy process. That process is relatively open and candid. But it
may frustrate the goals of race case prosecutions. Color-coded prose
cution, on the other hand, evades confession of the inscription of racial

status for instrumental purposes. Evasion of this sort covertly
preserves status distinctions as relevant to the advocacy process but
denies, or publicly withholds, its endorsement of such distinctions and
their tactical relevance for fear of inviting claims of prejudice. This
process is oblique and dissembling. Nonetheless, it may better advance
the goals of race prosecutions.
Discarding the neutral claims of standard discretion under color
blind and color-coded prosecutions unseals the advocacy process in
race cases exposing its race-conscious purposes. Candid disclosure of
those purposes is a virtue unacknowledged by standard discretion.
Disclosure is a virtue because it brings honesty to the public debate
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over racial injustice, and because it furthers the public policy of racial
reparation for individual victims of violence and of redemption for
communities inured to violence, white and black.

The virtue of candor in embracing racial status and in designing a
race-conscious process of advocacy links the prosecution function to
citizenship. This linkage wrests the meaning of black citizenship from
the stigma of antebellum and postbellum characterizations. Wresting
meaning from the stigmatizing portraits of black victims and their
accompanying communities revives a dialogic process in law, culture,
and society. Revival stirs cross-racial economic exchange, social
interaction, and political participation. These moments of community
dialogue and joinder intimate the possibility of reconciliation.
At the same time, the linkage rescues white citizenship from its
collective acceptance of antebellum and postbellum racial indignity
and inequality. Rescuing white citizenship from its own acquiescence
in such inequities allows for a kind of collective redemption. White
redemption is grounded in the sorrow of remorse. Unlike black
redemption and its locus of retribution, white redemption seeks to
repair and to reconcile relations of historical violence. That allowance
arrives from the candid prosecutorial decision to present the advocacy
process openly as a means to restore the dignity of black victims and
to redeem the conscience of white offenders, their communities, and
the state. 156 Restoration includes black retribution and forgiveness.
Redemption includes white punishment and penitence. Retributive
punishment and mercy are integral to the reciprocal morality of
citizenship. Reciprocity honors the norms of dignity and mutual re
spect. It forges sympathetic attachments across racial lines.
The candid process orientation of race-conscious discretion
burdens the already strained prosecutoriaJ role of state partisan and
public minister. As a partisan of the state, the prosecutor strives to
enforce the law by preventing, deterring, and punishing wrongdoing.
As a minister of justice, he seeks to find the right result in balancing
the interests of the accused, the victim, and the public. This role com
petition occurs along a shifting boundary line. That line is affixed to
color. It dictates the freedom and constraint to engage in colorblind,
color-coded, and color-conscious advocacy. To be effective, the

156. Symbolically and normatively, candor exposes criminal reprosecutions as a cate
gory of race trials, rather than the more blunt category of political trials. See David Garland,
Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal Justice, in 11 STUDIES IN
LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 191 (Austin Sarat & Susan s . Silbey eds., 1991); Joseph E.
Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000) . Compare DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF OLD CRIMES: BALANCING LEGAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MORAL CONCERNS (2000), with AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 15977 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1 994).
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boundaries of freedom and constraint must be reasonably determi
nate. In race cases, the boundary lines are frustratingly indeterminate.
Prosecutors experience the indeterminacy of color in assembling
the goals and claims of race cases. Based on victim, offender, and
community interests, those goals and claims may be asserted under
colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious standards of discretion.
The standards shape the character of identity and the content of narra
tive heard in advocacy. Identity and narrative are highly contingent on
fact and law. The complex accumulation of facts and the aggregation
of multiple legal theories and authorities in race cases heightens this
sense of indeterminacy. In the racial spiral of retrospectively collected
factual claims and statutorily culled legal claims, the lines separating
colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious advocacy blur.
The indeterminacy of fact produced in unearthing long-buried evi
dence157 and in amassing legal materials gives race cases an unbounded
quality where zealous advocacy seems to proceed unrestricted. That
unbounded sense is intensified by the brutality of the underlying crime
and the intervening passage of time. Unlike antecedent crimes and
periods of racial violence, the reprosecution of race cases gives rise to
an epochal sense of historic combat and enduring legacy. Gripped by
this sensibility, prosecutors struggle to balance their duties to law
enforcement and public j ustice. Instead of finding equipoise, they
collapse the duties into a single compelling partisan obligation to
avenge violence by any colored means necessary.
The coloring of partisanship into racially coded advocacy is
restrained by the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of standard discretion.
That restraint is partial. Given the compulsion of zealous advocacy,
neither the factors of legality and justice, nor the variables of ethics
rules, constitutional values, and community norms, supplies adequate
controls. Insofar as each set of considerations draws on a lawyer's

practical judgment in the interpretation of legal rules, the purpose of
the rules may itself provide mitigating restraint. Both criminal and
civil rights laws harbor compelling public purposes.

The reprosecution of race cases entails the application of lawyer
judgment in interpreting the purposes of criminal and civil rights laws.
Applying legal rules signals lawyer independence. Discretion is a
function of that independence. The race-conscious exercise of lawyer
discretion seeks to integrate the interests of the victim, offender, and
public into the normative framework of criminal and civil rights law.
That framework contains punitive and redemptive purposes rooted in
penitence, reparation, and even restoration. Integration strives to

157. See Marlon Manuel, Church Bombing Case Tums on Old Evidence, ATLANTA J.
CONST., May 1, 2001, at AS; Jean Marbella, Sins of Past Still Cry Out for Justice Conscience:
Witnesses are Breaking Years of Silence and Calling Aging Men to Answer for Crimes of the
1960s, BALT. SUN, May 20, 2001, at Cl.
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unify the interests of the accused, the victim, and the public in
punishing white defendants and in redeeming white communities.
Absent black and white community reconciliation, redemption will be
subverted and the overarching purposes of criminal and civil rights
laws will be nullified.158
The pursuit of black-white reconciliation motivates the race
conscious model of purposive lawyering. This independent-minded
practice model departs from an adversarial framework. Yet, like its
predecessor, that purposive framework relies on ethics rules and
standards for regulation. The colorblind instincts and color-coded ten
dencies of conventional ethics rules undermine the candor demanded
of race-conscious discretion. Accommodating candid midlevel proce
dures in reprosecutions that account for racial status, ·multiple
party interests, and competing private and public needs requires
independent j udgment reached in collaboration with black and white
communities. Cross-cutting collaboration is the springboard for com
munity-guided ethical discretion in race cases. The next Part considers
the basis for community-guided restorative discretion.
V.

COMMUNITY-GUIDED RESTORATIVE DISCRETION

The idea of community-guided restorative discretion furnishes an
additional j ustification for the resurgent prosecution of white-on-black
racial violence. Restorative discretion modifies standard prosecutorial

discretion by loosening adversarial norms and intermixing race
conscious community norms. Modification leaves intact the intrinsic
sources of legality and j ustice as well as the extrinsic sources of ethics,
constitutional values, and community norms.
Restoratively gleaned, intrinsic and extrinsic sources of discretion
channel prosecutors toward interracial reconciliation. Under the stan
dard conception of discretion, the intrinsic value of legality creates
powerful law enforcement imperatives. Rather than weaken those
imperatives, race-conscious discretion expands the framework of
legality to encompass the public purposes of relevant criminal and civil
rights laws.
Restorative discretion further enlarges that framework to take
account of both victim and community reparations.159 In race cases,

158. For useful discussions of indeterminacy and independence in lawyering, see Robert
W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988), and David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). See also Alfieri, Impover
ished Practices, supra note 127, at 2654-60.
159. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION (2001); Anthony E.
Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations,
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959 (2000) ; Alfred L. Brophy, Losing the {Understanding the Im
portance of} Race: Evaluating the Significance of Race and the Utility of Reparations, 80
TEXAS L. REV. 911 (2002) (reviewing JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF
SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA (2000) ).

March 2003]

Retrying Race

1 189

reparations refer to both spiritual and material recompense. The
reparations may come from the offender in the form of atonement and
restitution, from white communities in the form of public penitence, or
from the state in the form of contrition and compensation for mental,

physical, and economic harm.160 Of greater symbolic than monetary
value, the offering of apology may contribute to racial conciliation.161
Similarly instilled within standard discretion, the intrinsic value of
j ustice commands potent retributive claims. Incited by vengeance, the
claims implicitly boast the vigor of prevention and deterrence. Taken
seriously, this boast suggests that the severity of vengeance works not
only to prevent (by death), but also to deter (by fear) crimes of racial
violence. Race-conscious discretion applauds such instrumental
averments. Explicit in remedial purpose, it seeks to halt racial vio
lence.
Restorative discretion views the plaudits of vengeance with more
reservation. In spite of its asserted efficacy, vengeance wreaks
profound damage on community. For some communities of color, the
damage may prove irreparable. The joint fa ilure of white communities
and the state to enjoin or remedy that damage weighs heavily on
conciliation, diminishing the likelihood of black forgiveness. The dete
rioration of forgiveness renders mercy for white offenders and their
communities improbable. The decline of mercy in turn may discourage
acts of atonement. Absent atonement, redemption ceases.
The debilitation of intrinsic sources of discretion under the stan
dard conception of prosecution also saps extrinsic sources. Ethics
rules, for instance, blinded by the pretense of neutrality, stumble in
regulating the color-coded practices that permeate the criminal-justice
system. Race-conscious discretion cures this blindness only to

substitute a different sort of myopia. That is the myopia induced by
the unstable boundaries of color in advocacy.
Even for clear-eyed prosecutors, the lines segmenting colorblind,
color-coded, and color-conscious claims of advocacy fluctuate and
regularly fade from view. Restorative discretion accepts this fluctua
tion as part of the instability of race and the mutability of racial
identity. It appreciates that the facts of racial violence and the laws
delineating its prosecution are vulnerable to multifaceted readings
that may veer interpretatively from colorblind to color-coded and
back. It also recognizes that these distinctions are contextual, surfacing
in the everyday practice of advocacy and adjudication.

160. See Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, Restitution Program Models with Adult Offend
ers, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 165 (Burt Galaway & Joe
Hudson eds., 1990).
161. On the use and subversion of apology, see Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The
Cornrnodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000) , and Deborah L. Levi, Note, The
Role ofApology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997).
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Densely layered within criminal-justice roles, relations, and institu
tions, distinctions of color frequently resist easy discernment. Prosecu
torial roles in courtroom advocacy and neighborhood outreach nimbly
combine colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious approaches, for
example in j ury selection and "qualify-of-life" policing.162 Prosecuto
rial relations with offenders, criminal defense lawyers, and j udges
mingle the same approaches in street-level profiling and disqualifica
tion motions.163 Prosecutorial institution-wide policies also blend these
approaches in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing.164 Sometimes
interchangeable, the approaches succumb to conscious and uncon
scious bias.
The insinuations of bias are entrenched in the materials of law and
the tactics of advocacy. Colorblind claims may appear facially neutral
and laudable, yet they may shelter animus. Without refuge from
invidious intent, such claims engender racially disparate consequences
in law enforcement. Color-coded claims may seem correspondingly
neutral, yet they too elicit suspiciously disparate effects.165 Even when
prosecutors dispense with the veneer of impartiality in favor of a
color-conscious approach, their claims may produce disparate
outcomes, especially where race intersects gender, ethnicity, or
sexuality. Despite these intricacies and contradictions, restorative dis
cretion trusts the practical discernment of colored boundaries to the
good faith of prosecutorial judgment, checked by community-guided
intrinsic and extrinsic sources of restraint.166
Extrinsic sources of community-guided discretion flow from the
constitutional values of dignity and equality. Aimed at offender-

162. Compare GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1 996), with
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING (2001), and Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social
Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999).
163. See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race,
and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000); F. Michael Higgin
botham, In Memoriam: A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. - A Man for All Seasons, 16 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 7, 1 1 (2000) ; Martha Minow, Strippe<I Down Like a Runner or Enriched
by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201
(1 992). For discussion of race-based recusal and disqualification motions, see Blank v. Sulli
van & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), and Pennsylvania v. Local 542, lnt'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
164. On prosecutorial coloring in charging, plea bargaining, trial, and sentencing, see
LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 18711872 (1996); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: En
forcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 071 (1997), and
Lu-in Wang, Unwarranted Assumption in the Prosecution and Defense of Hate Crimes, 17
CRIM. JUST. 4 (2002).
165. On the appearance of prejudice, see Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The
Logic ofAmerican Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000) .
166. See Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, supra note 10, at 1480-91 , 1502-07.
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specific retribution and unmindful of victim well-being, standard
discretion discounts the value of dignitary and equality interests.
Constitutional norms elevate dignity in safekeeping individual
integrity and collective liberty from state onslaught or neglect.
Moreover, they enhance equality in securing the evenhanded protec
tion of communities. In race cases, those interests unite black victims
and their communities.
Dignity applies equally in life and death. It is the root indignity of
white superiority and black inferiority that instigates white-on-black
violence. The act of white violence compounds that indignity. The
failure to prosecute white violence, and to eradicate its societal under

pinnings, magnifies indignity and ensures its continuation.
Equality also pertains to life and death. It is the inequality of the
white-black hierarchy in economic and social relationships that
permits a culture of white-on-black violence to flourish. Repeated acts
of white violence reinforce black subordinate positions in that
hierarchy. The historic failure to punish white violence, and alter the
asymmetrical relationships of socioeconomic status, preserves
inequality in society and guarantees a powerless black position in
politics.

Race-conscious discretion honors victim dignitary and equality
values. Highlighting the plight of black victims and the menace to
black communities, it attacks white violence for lawbreaking and for
denigrating individual and collective dignity. It focuses that attack on
racial status, adducing evidence of status-based motive in offender
conduct and summoning statutory sanction under criminal and civil
rights law. Strengthened by a penalty-enhancement proviso, that
summons increasingly calls on hate crime legislation for remedy.
Although hate crime legislation captures the thrust of racial violence,
it mislays emphasis on retaliation. Reprisal cedes slim ground for
redemption.
Restorative discretion mitigates the retaliatory force of race
conscious hate crime prosecution. Endeavoring to repair dignity and
equality through conciliation, it petitions for offender atonement,
victim forgiveness, and state mercy. Contraposed to the punitive
appeal of standard and race-conscious discretion, the petition declares
the redeemability of white lawbreakers and the possibility of racial re
form even when personal history and practical reason tilt to the con
trary. That declaration complicates the relationship of punishment to
redemption.
Nothing in the formal definition of redemption precludes punish

ment. In fact, its predicate acts - atonement, contrition, penitence imply punishment of a robust size. The acts signal an acknowledge
ment of wrongdoing. This admission, coupled with promises of
physical rehabilitation and spiritual reformation, hardly amounts to
punishment. For redemption to be credible, some deprivation of
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proportionate duration and severity must ensue. Pressed too far in
severity, punishment may undermine the chance of white contrition.167
In the same way, violence pushed too far in its brutality may undercut
the prospect of black forgiveness. Cruelty in either respect runs afoul
of redemption.
To survive incidents of private violence and public punishment,
restorative discretion must establish a benchmark for the reinstallation
of dignity and equality. The preference for reinstallation over restora
tion stems from the difficulty of recollecting black dignity and equality
in American law and society. Recollections gathered from antebellum,
postbellum, and Jim Crow eras find dignity battered and equality
destitute. Neither finding is fatal to redemption.
Dignity inhabits manifold public and private spheres. The spheres
are cross-cut by cleavages of race. The cleavages divide public space
into black and white redoubts. Within these strongholds, black
communities realize their own sense of dignity inlayed by culture and
social history.168 Outside of these strongholds, where public space
overlaps black and white geography in culture, economics, and
politics, black communities suffer the indignities of inferiority,
subordination, and violence.169 Inexorably, the battering of black dig
nity in a white-dominated public space will disturb the experience of
black dignity in alternative public and private spaces.
To disturb dignity is not to extinguish it. The civil rights movement
demonstrates that dignity can endure public violence and private
humiliation. 170 The early history of the movement in particular shows
that dignity can overcome even unbridled violence.'7' Triumphing over
violence unsuccessfully resolves the tension spawned by differential
assessments of dignitary values by victims and communities of color,

167. Punishment may influence demonstrations of remorse. See Theodore Eisenberg et
al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. Rev.
1599 (1998); Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis
of Popular Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168-90 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Michael
A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 V AND. L.
Rev. 1 (2003); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. Rev. 1557 (1998).
168. See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1803 (2000) .
169. See Regina Austin, "An Honest Living": Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and
the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 21 1 9 (1994); Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves":
Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1 994 UTAH L. Rev. 147;
Regina Austin, "Not Just for the Fun of It!": Governmental Restraints on Black Leisure, So
cial Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space, 71 S. CAL. L. Rev. 667 (1998); Debra
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Ufe in Public Places: Courts, Communities,
and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. Rev. 551 (1 997).
170. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954-63 (1988); TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65
(1998).
171. See JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK Now AGAINST THE DAY: THE GENERATION BEFORE
.
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH (1994).
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the public, and the state. That tension is inescapable given the rich
diversity of color, the separatist fervor of the public, and the segrega
tionist legacy of the state.172 The failure to organize some union among
these variable assessments limits the redemptive guidance of constitu
tional values.

Comparable limits impinge on the constitutional value of equality
in restorative discretion. Like the attempt to recapture black dignity,
the effort to restore black equality collides with the recollections of
hardship mined from the antebellum, postbellum, and Jim Crow eras.
Those recollections provide a benchmark for equality notched by

poverty and stratification. That benchmark is anathema to restorative

discretion. The handiwork of post-Reconstruction tools for demeaning
socioeconomic status, the benchmark recalls a time of malignant
inequality that continues in many sectors of the black community.173
To obtain a more satisfactory principle of equality in guiding race
cases, prosecutors must turn again to the civil rights movement, par
ticularly to antidiscrimination laws.174 Unlike the more controversial
claim of preferential treatment,175 the turn to civil rights and its
memory of struggle176 points to the inadequacy of the colorblind
approach in alleviating inequality in the criminal-justice system.177 For
race cases, only a forward-looking race-conscious approach to prose
cution intent upon ameliorating the socioeconomic position of black
communities will satisfy the goal of restorative justice. Amelioration
comes in uplifting the legal, socioeconomic, and political status of
communities, not simply in a flurry of apologies or an award of repara
tions.

172 See Anita Christina Butera, Assimilation, Pluralism and Multiculturalism: The Pol
icy of RaciaVEthnic Identity in America, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2001); Patrick F.
Linehan, Thinking Outside of the Box: The Multiracial Category and Its Implications for
Race Identity Development, 44 How. L.J. 43 (2000).
173. See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL (1992); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. D ENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
174. See Tanya Katerf Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the
Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws: A United States-Latin America Comparison, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2002); Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality,
and A ntidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 194 (2000) .
175. See Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential" Treatment, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 943 (2002).
176. See Katherine M. Franke, The Uses of History in Struggles for Racial Justice: Colo
nizing the Past and Managing Memory, 47 U CLA L. REV. 1673 (2000) ; Bill Maurer, Visions
of Fact; Languages of Evidence: History, Memory, and the Trauma of Legal Research, 26
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 893 (2001) (reviewing HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999)).
177. Colorblind axioms also flounder in combating race discrimination outside the
black-white paradigm. See Liann Ebesugawa, State v. Rogan: Racial Discrimination and
Limits of the Color-Blind Approach, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 821 (2002); David H. Getches,
Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and
Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001).
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Uplifting the racial status •of victims and communities of color
slows the dilution of extrinsic sources of discretion under the standard
colorblind approach to race case prosecutions. Community norms
maintain a weak presence in the exercise of standard discretion.
Displaced by adversarial rituals, the norms are shunted aside in the
individualized hunt for criminal convictions.178 Both offender and
victim communities are shunned in this hunt, their participation
stunted, and their voices silenced.179
Race-conscious discretion reincorporates community into the
prosecution process. Implanting the offender and victim in commu
nity, it searches white and black constituents for signs of color
consciousness. It is color that connects the private acts of criminal
lawbreaking to a public constellation of actors. For white offenders,
color connects up to communities founded on racial superiority. For
black victims, color attaches to communities trapped by racial inferi
ority. Release from these parallel entrapments requires the blunt,
race-conscious assignment of collective responsibility to white com
munities tolerant of racial violence and to states complicit in such ac
quiescence, an acquiescence that signals the collapse of public/private
boundaries recognized by postbellum constitutional and statutory
jurisprudence enacted by Congress during Reconstruction.180 It also
demands race-conscious sensitivity to the insidious devaluation of
black communities as cultural and economic resources.

1 78. On the integration of community norms in criminal and civil rights law, see PENDA
D. HAIR, ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS, COMMUNITIES
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 151-55 (2001) (urging incorporation of race into a com
munity framework of justice). See also John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional
Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1927 (1 999); Steven F. Lawson, Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography
of the Civil Rights Movement, 96 AM. HIST. REV. 456 (1991); Christian Sundquist, Critical
Praxis, Spirit Healing, and Community Activism: Preserving a Subversive Dialogue on Repa
rations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 659 (2003). Compare Richard Delgado, Prosecuting
Violence: A Colloquy on Race, Community, and Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2000) , with
ROBERT WEISBERG, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE DANGERS OF COMMUNITY (Stanford
Law School, Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 50, Feb. 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
179. The unreflective defense of criminal offe nders independent of third-party interests
contributes to this silence. See Darryl K. Brown, Thirrl-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80
TEXAS L. REV. 1383 (2002); Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated
Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925 (2000) . The
same silence attends the neglect of role and racial identity. Compare ARTHUR ISAK
APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE 6 1 -75 (1999), with David B. Wilkins, Beyond "Bleached out" Profes
sionalism: Defining Professional Responsibility for Real Professionals, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 207-34 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000).
180. On the constitutional and statutory bases of prosecuting bias crimes, see
FREDERICK M. LAWR ENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 1 1 060 (1999).
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Standing alone, neither race-conscious responsibility nor race
conscious evaluation will achieve restorative results. To achieve
restorative j ustice, white communities must accept responsibility for

violence and contrition. Inversely, black communities must shoulder
the obligation of forgiveness. Redemptive responsibility is not easily
seized or imposed. It is a process shaken by internal quarrel over the
criminal-j ustice goals and claims of prosecution in race cases.
Internal quarrels over prosecution goals and claims upset commu
nities and state agents. Broadening prosecutorial goals from punish
ment to mercy incites disagreement within black communities. Shifting
claims from culpability to contrition inflames the resentments of white

communities. Adding to this internal discord is the external friction
generated by prosecutor-community and prosecutor-state conflict.
Offender and victim communities may clash with prosecutor-slated
goals and claims. Federal, state, and local agents may also spar over
the ranking of prosecutor goals and claims.

Restorative discretion concedes a broad spectrum of conflicts
dividing communities and the state. It anticipates both internal dissen

sion voiced within communities and external dissent announced within
the state forums of administrative agencies, courts, and legislatures.
Unsure of the exact permutations of dissension, it insists that the
resolution of these conflicts occur in a grassroots collaborative
context, rather than by paternalistic decree. The key to resolution is
the renunciation of colorblind prosecution.

Community-guided restorative discretion is color-conscious. Re
j ecting the pretense of neutrality as false and unproductive, it substi
tutes candor in addressing the histories of racial violence and in set
tling the differences of racial community. Candor introduces an open
process of prosecutorial decisionmaking. That process is republican: it
calls for civic participation and public deliberation in setting the goals
and claims of race case prosecutions. It demands the development of
midlevel procedures that are responsive to racial status, multiple party
and nonparty interests, and competing private and public needs. And
it relies on independent practical j udgment and community collabora
tion.
The institutional development of midlevel procedures to guide
prosecutorial discretion builds from the groundwork of restorative
j ustice. 181 Out of that groundwork come claims of atonement and

181. See DENNIS SULLIVAN & LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING THE
FOUNDATIONS OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES (2001 ); David H. Bayley, Security and Justice for
A ll, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 211 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite
eds., 2001); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Ac
counts, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry & Norval Mor
ris eds., 1 999); Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restorative Justice
Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717 (2000) ;
Glenn M. Kaas, Restorative Justice: A New Paradigm for the Prosecutor, PROSECUTOR,
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mercy.182 Those claims challenge conventional theories of punish
ment183 and deterrence,184 giving rise to an exploration of alternative
sanctions.185 Steering a path between vengeance and forgiveness,186 the
exploration leads to an evolving reconceptualization of racial violence
as a hybrid form of legal-political crime. Conceived as such, race cases
afford the opportunity to consider alternative prosecutorial strategies
borrowed

from
restorative
and
transitional
j ustice
experi
ments abroad, for example in South Africa under the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission187 and in East Germany.188 Those alterna
tive strategies of racial reconciliation rest heavily on narrative.189

Nov./Dec. 2000, at 31; Clifford Shearing, Transforming Security: A South African Experi
ment, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra, at 14.
1 82. See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999);
David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs, then Why Is It So
Hard to Find?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663 (2000); Robert L. Misner, A Strategy for Mercy,
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303 (2000); Mary Sigler, The Story ofJustice: Retribution, Mercy,
and the Role of Emotions in the Capital Sentencing Process, 19 LAW & PHIL. 339 (2000) .
183. See Kathleen Daly, Revisiting the Relationship Between Retributive and Restorative
Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE 33 (Heather Strang & John
Braithwaite eds., 2000); David Dolinko, The Fut11re of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1719
(1999); Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Deserts: Criminal
Law, Punishment Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2000).
184. See Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 943 (2000) ; Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deter
rence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 ( 1997); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 1 13
HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997).
1 85. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591
(1996); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beawifully Retributive? Retributivism and
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 V AND. L. REV. 2157 (2001 ); Dieter
Rossner, Mediation as a Basic Element of Crime Control: Theoretical and Empirical Com
ments, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 211 (1999).
186. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Douglas B. Amnar, Forgiveness
and the Law-A Redemptive Opportunity, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 583 (2000) ; Susan Bandes,
When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599 (2000) .
1 87. See Mariah Jackson Christensen, The Promise of Truth Commissions in Times of
Transitions, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695 (2002); Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institu
tions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U.
TORONTO L.J. 355 (1999); Donald W. Shriver, Jr., Truth Commissions and Judicial Trials:
Complementary or Antagonistic Servants of Public Justice? 16 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (2001);
Anurima Bhargava, Note, Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study of the South African
Truth ancl Reconciliation Commission, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1304 (2002).
188. See Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
Understanding Transitional Justice, 1 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39 (2002); Maryam Kamali, Ac
countability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of Transitional Justice in East
Germany and Sowh Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 89 (2001); Charles Vila-Vicencio,
Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court
and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205 (2000).
189. See Stephane Leman-Langlois, Constructing a Common Language: The Function of
Nuremberg in the Problematization of Postapartheid Justice, 27 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 79
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The narratives of restorative discretion break from the lexicon of
retributive punishment in prosecuting race cases. They depart in
search of redemption and reconciliation. The language of redemption
speaks of contrition and atonement. The language of reconciliation
talks of forgiveness and mercy. Both invoke the rhetoric of community
on behalf of the offender, victim, public, and state. Borne of violence,
that rhetoric may ring empty. Enlarging its meaning outside of the
adversary tradition requires translation.
Prosecutorial translation of the retributive tradition into a restora
tive approach to criminal j ustice for offenders, victims, and their
adjoining communities depends on narrative. Restorative narratives
strive for empathy. Locating offender and victim stories in the racial
ized histories of segregated communities, they seek to promote
empathic understanding in lay public and private forums, and among
legal and political decisionmakers. Understanding differs from
enlightenment. It arises from hearing stories of racial violence in
common places: churches, schools, and public squares. Hearing stories
provides the basis for cross-racial learning and dialogue in the
innumerable venues of law, culture, and society. For public agents and
private citizens, dialogue across racial lines contributes to an informed
and empathic decisionmaking process in criminal j ustice and civic gov
ernance.
The adversarial practices of the criminal-j ustice system shackle the
open search for information documenting racial violence and obstruct
the dialogue essential for the redemptive resolution of race cases. The
task of restorative discretion is to unfetter that search and to stimulate

dialogue. The goal is to initiate and, if possible, sustain a
multigenerational conversation between black and white communities
about their mutual interests in redemptive justice.
Numerous obstacles j eopardize that conversation. Narratives are
typically disjointed and contradictory. Stories are often incomplete
and misleading. Dialogue is fragile and ephemeral. And empathy is
vulnerable to the cognitive staining of color. But none of these deficits
is more devastating than internal community strife. Internal divisive
ness over the goals and claims of race prosecutions compromises the
ability to repair black communities and redeem white communities.
To surmount these obstacles, prosecutors must engage offender
and victim communities and their subgroups in a discussion about the
shared benefits of reparation and redemption. Law offers no universal
narrative or story capable of conveying those benefits. Because the
benefits accrue differently to black and white communities, and
splinter further within multicultural communities, colorblind discourse

(2002); Jamie L. Wacks, A Proposal for Community-Based Racial Reconciliation in the
United States Through Personal Stories, 7 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 195 (2000) .
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fares badly}90 Instead of race-neutral or binary accounts of sociolegal
benefit, prosecutors must draw upon the communities' diverse identity
resources, finding common ground in social difference and historical
alliance in Iaw. 191
By celebrating difference and its defense under criminal and civil
rights law, prosecutors may be able to overcome status distinctions
between and among racial communities. Those distinctions are
enmeshed in symbolic and narrative descriptions of racial superiority
and inferiority. The descriptions objectify and, thereby, deform

offenders and victims. Interwoven in law and society, the process of
objectification in contemporary race prosecutions too often reduces
white offenders to objects of segregationist zealotry and black victims
to feeble objects of pity. Neither punishment nor acquittal will arrest
this reductionist tendency. Moreover, neither result will save its
objects and their extended communities from harm.
In race cases, harm is experienced on individual and collective
planes. For black victims and their communities, harm stigmatizes
racial status. Black stigma is signified by powerlessness. Standard

discretion attributes victimization to powerlessness, accenting its
irremediable condition. It conjures images of historical vulnerability
and passive resistance. Part of the purpose of race-conscious restora
tive discretion is to show that black victims actively resisted violence
and that the intervening years of state inaction cloaked constant grass
roots struggle.192 Juridically restoring the historical power to resist

individually and to struggle collectively against violence redeems the
status of black communities in American law and society. That
restoration of power enables those communities to demand punish
ment and yet pronounce mercy. The forgiveness underlying mercy
redeems black communities in spirit and civic culture. For white
offenders and their communities, mercy offers the reciprocal opportu
nity for atonement and redemption.

Race case prosecutors redeem black power in opposition to, and in
conciliation with, the forces of white violence in northern and
southern states. Redeeming the oppositional stance of black communi
ties to white violence corrects misapprehensions of racialized roles in
the historical record. Those misapprehensions led to the demeaning of

190. See Melissa Cole, The Color-Blind Constitwion, Civil Rights-Talk, and a Multicul
tural Discourse for a Post-Reparations World, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 127
(1999); Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Ac·
tion, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331 (2000).
191. See Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1467 (2000); David M. Skover & Kellye Y. Testy, LesBiGay Identity as Commodity, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 223 (2002)..
192. See MARY FRANCIS BERRY, BLACK RESISTANCE, WHITE LAW (1994); LANI
GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002).
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black character and community in law.rand society. Restorative discre
tion affirms the dignity of black character and the centrality of black
community to the pursuit of equality. Redeeming the conciliatory
stance of black communities to white communities that harbor fugitive

zealots renews the spirituality of the civil rights movement.193 Renewal
slackens the adversarial pull of retributive punishment, offering the
prospect of mercy, forgiveness, and reconciliation.194
Prosecutorial-urged reconciliation in race cases is a practical
enterprise. It occurs in the painful context of brutal fact and failed law.
Its success is less contingent on case selection and strategy than on the
capacity to bring candid, race-conscious perspectives to the prosecu
tion of long-standing incidents of white-on-black violence. Tailored to
the changing identity of offenders and. victims, those perspectives look
for guidance in cross-racial conversations and collaborations.195 No
longer merely accountable to the state or unaccountable to the
morality of race,196 redemptive prosecutors engage the contested
judgments of interracial community.

CONCLUSION
Part of a larger project devoted to the study of race, lawyers, and
ethics within the criminal-justice system, this Essay set out to conduct
an investigation of the recently renewed prosecution of long dormant
criminal and civil rights cases of white-on-black racial violence. Both
descriptive and prescriptive in orientation, it tried to capture the

normative and sociolegal meaning of this now resurgent prosecution.
The purpose of securing that elusive meaning was to cast and recast
the parameters of the prosecutor's redemptive role in cases of racial
violence.
The Essay commenced its appraisal of prosecutorial norms and
practices in retrying cases of white-oQ-black violence with a brief
survey of race in relation to law and community, a review of race case
genealogy, and a summary of renewed prosecution efforts in criminal
and civil rights cases from the 1950s and 1 960s. To discover a justifica
tion for retrying race cases, the Essay evaluated the standard concep
tion of prosecutorial discretion, its intrinsic and extrinsic sources of

193. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990); Anthony E. Cook, The Spiri·
tual Movement Towards Justice, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1007 (1 993).
1 94. See Roy Reed, Dahmer Murder Enrages Whites; Reaction to Slaying Reflects a
Changing Hauiesburg, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1 966, at 12; Roy Reed, Release of Klansman,
Jailed for Killing Black Leader, Is Decried in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1 972, at 17.
195. See ERIC K. y AMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999).
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1 96. See K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE
POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE (1 996).
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content, and its staunch ties to the adversary system. Next it analyzed
the notion of race-conscious discretion and its adaptability as an alter
native j ustification. Last it assessed the idea of community-guided
restorative discretion as a more compelling theory of justification. At
each tum, the Essay attempted to reweave prosecutorial ethics and
community norms in retrying cases of racial violence.197
It is unlikely that weaving a redemptive role for prosecutors in
cases of racial violence and spinning out strands toward state
sponsored restorative conciliation will soon reform the criminal-justice
system or reconstruct community. Nonetheless, they demonstrate the
potential importance of prosecutorial leadership in teaching parties,
nonparties, and the public about the different historical realities of
racial dignity and inequality in law and society. This race-conscious
pedagogy of prosecution may prove useful to legal education, law
enforcement, and civil rights advocacy.198 It also may serve to
reinvigorate hate crime and bias laws, and promote interracial j ustice.
For prosecutors entangled in the historical filaments of racial identity
and narrative, redemption may seem inapposite. The call of lawyer
shame and redemption, however, echoes throughout the American
legal history of race.199 The echo of redemptive prosecution sounds the
highest calling.

197. For earlier reconstructive efforts, see Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999) ; Anthony V. Alfieri, Ethics, Race, and Reform, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 1389 (2002); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1996).
1 98. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching the Law of Race, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1 605 (2001);
Judy L. Isaksen, From Critical Race Theory to Composition Studies: Pedagogy and Theory
Building, 24 LEGAL STUD. F. 695 (2000).
1 99. See Paul 0. Carrington, u1wyers Amid the Redemption of the South, 5 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 41 {1999); Paul Finkelman, Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro
Slavery, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 75 (1999).

